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1 
Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive 
Damage Awards 
Jill Wieber Lens 
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court’s most recent 
opinion on punitive damage awards, the Court declared that the real 
problem with punitive damage awards is their “stark unpredictability.” 
The Court abandoned all hope that common law jury instructions could 
produce predictable punitive damage awards. Instead, the Court 
suggested pegging punitive damage awards to compensatory damage 
awards. So far, analysis of the opinion has been minimal, likely due to 
the purported maritime law basis of the holding. 
Exxon should not be overlooked, however, as it signals a resurgence 
of procedural due process as a basis for challenging punitive damage 
awards—a type of challenge that the Court has not heard since the early 
1990s. Predictability of the amount is no different than fair notice of 
the likely severity of an award, which procedural due process requires. If 
common law jury instructions cannot produce predictable punitive 
damage awards, they also cannot produce awards consistent with the 
notice procedural due process requires. The Exxon Court’s pegging 
solution will not produce predictable awards (and ones that comply 
with procedural due process) because it relies on compensatory damages, 
which are inherently unpredictable. As an alternative, this Article 
suggests looking to restitution, a non-controversial punitive, civil 
remedy. Basing punitive damages on the defendant’s gain would 
produce predictable awards—as procedural due process requires. 
 
   Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law. J.D., University of 
Iowa College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin. The Author thanks Todd Pettys and Luke 
Meier for their valuable comments on earlier drafts and the faculty of Texas Tech University 
Law School for their feedback as part of Baylor’s scholarship exchange. The Author also thanks 
Hailee Amox, Baylor J.D. 2013, for her valuable research assistance. Any mistakes are, of 
course, the Author’s.  
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury panel, the purpose of punitive 
damages is “not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury, but to 
punish the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting the 
public by deterring the defendant and others from doing such wrong 
in the future.”1 In determining the amount of punitive damages, you 
“must take into consideration the character and degree of the wrong 
as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar 
wrong.”2  
In 1991, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,3 Justice 
O’Connor found that these—and all common law—jury instructions 
violate procedural due process because they “provide[] no 
meaningful standards to guide the jury’s decision to impose punitive 
damages or to fix the amount.”4 These jury instructions—and 
common law punitive damages procedures generally—lead to “wildly 
unpredictable results and glaring unfairness.”5 
 
 1. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 5. Id. at 49. 
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Justice O’Connor’s analysis in Haslip was a dissent. The majority 
in Haslip found that the common law jury instructions sufficiently 
constrained the jury’s discretion in imposing punitive damages.6 
After Haslip, the focus necessarily changed from procedural due 
process challenges of punitive awards to something else, mainly 
substantive due process. In the context of damages awards, the 
difference between procedural and substantive due process is that 
procedural due process examines the procedures used to impose an 
award, whereas substantive due process examines the award itself. 
Although the bases of the Court’s holdings in punitive damage cases 
have not always been entirely clear, since Haslip, each of the Court’s 
notable punitive damage opinions has been based on substantive due 
process.  
Almost twenty years after Haslip, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker,7 the Court again evaluated common law jury instructions used 
in imposing punitive damages. In fact, the Court revisited some of 
the same instructions it had reviewed in Haslip. It concluded that 
common law instructions cannot produce predictable punitive 
damage awards, and that “stark unpredictability” is the “real 
problem” with punitive awards.8 This unpredictability also leads to 
inconsistency because two cases involving very similar facts can 
produce dramatically different punitive awards.9 Although Exxon is a 
Supreme Court case about punitive damages, it has generally been 
overlooked because it is based in maritime law.10 The assumption 
that Exxon is not as important because of its maritime-law basis is 
unfortunate because the opinion signals the resurgence of procedural 
due process concerns with punitive damage awards.11 The opinion 
barely mentions maritime law, and the Court’s main focus—
predictability—has little to do with maritime law and everything to 
do with procedural due process. Both predictability and procedural 
due process are rooted in the rule of law, which requires laws to be 
specific enough to enable citizens to order their behavior 
accordingly. Naturally, both predictability and procedural due 
process require that defendants have some fair warning of the 
 
 6. See id. at 19 (majority opinion). 
 7. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 499. 
 9. See id. at 500–01. 
 10. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV.  
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amount of the punitive damage award, enabling defendants to order 
their behavior accordingly.12  
In Exxon, the Court asked whether common law jury 
instructions can produce predictable punitive damage awards. The 
majority answered “no.” This question of whether common law jury 
instructions can produce predictable punitive damage awards is no 
different than asking whether the same instructions can produce 
awards consistent with the fair notice of likely severity of an award 
that procedural due process already requires. Surprisingly, the Court 
has never answered this procedural due process question. But by 
concluding in Exxon that common law jury instructions cannot 
produce predictable awards, the Court effectually also concluded 
that common law jury instructions violate procedural due process: if 
the instructions are incapable of producing predictable awards, they 
cannot produce awards at a level of severity, (i.e., a likely amount), of 
which the defendant had fair notice. Further evidence of the 
procedural due process implications of Exxon is its remarkable 
similarities to Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Haslip. After Exxon, it 
seems unavoidable that common law jury instructions violate 
procedural due process due to their failure to produce predictable 
punitive damage awards and that some reform is necessary.  
The Court in Exxon offered a concrete solution to fix the 
unpredictability problem—pegging punitive damages to 
compensatory damage awards.13 Unfortunately, this suggestion is 
inherently doomed because the baseline used by the Court, the 
compensatory award, is unpredictable.14 Compensatory damages 
depend on the plaintiff and her injury, details that the defendant 
likely does not know before the tort.15 Further, tort law specifically 
mandates that the defendant may end up compensating the plaintiff 
for consequences no reasonable person could have foreseen, thereby 
precluding predictable awards.16 Apart from their unpredictability, 
compensatory damages are not a logical baseline for setting punitive 
damage awards because the availability of punitive damages does not 
depend on the amount of compensatory damages awarded.17  
 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 13. See discussion infra Part IV.D.  
 14. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 15. See discussion infra Part V.A.1. 
 16. See discussion infra Part V.A.3. 
 17. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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This Article proposes an alternative reform to make punitive 
damage awards predictable, as procedural due process requires. It 
argues that punitive damages should be modeled after another 
punitive remedy available in tort: restitution.18 Specifically, the 
amount of the punitive award should be based on the defendant’s 
gain.19 Using this measurement will finally create a logical, factual 
connection between the tortious conduct and the punitive damage 
award.20 Flexibility in the measurement, as already exists in 
restitution, will enable sufficient punishment and deterrence.21 Most 
importantly, a gain-based punitive award will improve predictability. 
Predictability results because, even though awards may differ, the 
award itself is based on the defendant’s tortious conduct, something 
the defendant comprehends before committing the tort.22 
Part II of this Article explores the Exxon decision generally. Part 
III explains the distinction between procedural and substantive due 
process, and argues that each of the Court’s opinions since Haslip 
has been based on substantive due process. Part IV explores Exxon as 
a procedural due process-based opinion and its consequences. Part V 
identifies the irony of Exxon—that the Court hopes to achieve 
predictability, but then suggests a reform that pegs punitive damages 
to an unpredictable baseline. Part VI then suggests basing punitive 
damages on the defendant’s gain.  
II. EXXON GENERALLY EXPLAINED 
Factually, Exxon was based on the Exxon Valdez oil spill.23 The 
defendant was found to be reckless in retaining a known relapsed 
alcoholic to captain a tanker carrying crude oil.24 The jury awarded 
the plaintiffs $287 million in compensatory damages.25 The jury also  
 
 
 18. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 19. See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
 20. See discussion infra Part VI.C.1. 
 21. See discussion infra Part VI.C.2. 
 22. See discussion infra Part VI.C.4. 
 23. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008). 
 24. Id. at 480. 
 25. Id. The defendant had already spent $2.1 billion in clean-up efforts, paid $25 
million in criminal fines and $100 million in restitution, $900 million in claims brought by the 
United States and Alaskan governments, and $303 million in voluntary settlements with other 
private parties. Id. at 479. 
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imposed $5 billion in punitive damages,26 which was later reduced to 
$2.5 billion.27  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a challenge to 
the punitive damage award based on maritime law, which is federal 
common law.28 The question before the Court was whether the $2.5 
billion punitive award was “greater than maritime law should allow 
in the circumstances.”29 Put differently, did the award exceed the 
“bounds justified by” maritime law?30 The Court explained that 
these questions required it to explore “the place of punishment in 
modern civil law and reasonable standards of punishment in 
administering punitive law.”31 The Court first reviewed the history of 
punitive damages.32 The Court then reviewed State regulation of 
punitive damage awards and remarked that “[d]espite these 
limitations, punitive damages overall are higher and more frequent in 
the United States than they are anywhere else.”33 The Court noted 
that American punitive damages had been a target of criticism.34 But 
the Court further noted that such criticism might not be entirely 
justified, given that studies showed “overall restraint” in the 
awarding of punitive damages.35  
Despite this restraint, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he 
real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive 
damage awards.”36 In reviewing statistics regarding the amounts of 
punitive damages awarded compared to the compensatory damages 
in the same cases, “the spread is great, and the outlier cases subject 
defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding 
compensatories.”37  
 
 26. Id. at 481. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See id. at 489. 
 29. Id. at 476. 
 30. Id. at 490. 
 31. Id.  
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. at 496. 
 34. Id. at 497. 
 35. Id. at 499. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 500. The authors of the study that the Court used in Exxon have criticized the 
Court’s consideration of awards with low compensatory damages, which will automatically 
have a higher ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages. See Theodore Eisenberg 
et al., Variability in Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 12–23 (2010); Catherine M. Sharkey, The 
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Such outliers may not have been problematic if they had resulted 
from the specific circumstances of the cases that had produced them. 
Unfortunately though, the system is not producing “fairly consistent 
results in cases with similar facts.”38 To support this assertion, the 
Court anecdotally noted that facts nearly identical to those that had 
produced a $4 million punitive damage award in BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore had also resulted in an award of no punitive 
damages in another case.39  
Having identified the unpredictability of punitive damages, the 
Court then turned to possible reforms to improve predictability. It 
quickly rejected “verbal formulations[] superimposed on general jury 
instructions” because “[i]nstructions can go just so far in promoting 
systemic consistency when awards are not tied to specifically proven 
items of damage (the cost of medical treatment, say) . . . .”40 Instead, 
the Court concluded that only a “quantified approach will work.”41 
But it declined to suggest a hard cap because “there is no ‘standard’ 
tort or contract injury,”42 and because of the legislature’s better 
ability to set caps and make adjustments for inflation.43  
According to the Court, the “more promising alternative” is 
“pegging punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio or 
maximum multiple.”44 In determining the proper ratio or multiple 
for this specific case, the Court revisited the facts: it was a “case of 
reckless action, profitless to the tortfeasor, resulting in substantial 
recovery for substantial injury.”45 Based on these facts, the Court 
rejected a 3:1 ratio.46 The Court also rejected a 2:1 ratio because it 
concluded that there was no need to provide an incentive to sue due 
to the large compensatory award.47 
 
 
Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
25, 41–42 (2009). 
 38. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 500. 
 39. Id. at 501. 
 40. Id. at 504. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 506. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 511. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (explaining that the case involved “staggering damage inevitably provoking 
governmental enforcers to indict and any number of private parties to sue”). 
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Ultimately, to formulate the appropriate ratio, the Court looked 
to the median ratio of punitive to compensatory damage awards 
produced in studies involving hundreds of punitive awards.48 The 
Court believed that this median or lower ratio 
roughly express[es] jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases 
with no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the 
punishable spectrum (cases like this one, without intentional or 
malicious conduct, and without behavior driven primarily by desire 
for gain, for example) and cases (again like this one) without the 
modest economic harm or odds of detection that have opened the 
door to higher awards.49 
The median was .65:1, but the Court defined a 1:1 ratio as a “fair 
upper limit in such maritime cases.”50 
 “Whatever may be the constitutional significance of the 
unpredictability of high punitive awards,”51 the Court claimed that 
that question was not before it. Instead, the Court based its decision 
on maritime law, a federal common law.  Unpredictability is 
inconsistent with maritime law because of the “implication of 
unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries in a 
system whose commonly held notion of law rests on a sense of 
fairness in dealing with one another.”52 Some lower courts have 
limited the Exxon holding as specific to maritime law;53 others have 
viewed Exxon as a much broader holding, possibly one with 
substantive due process constitutional implications.54 This Article 
 
 48. Id. at 512–13. 
 49. Id. at 513. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 502. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Myers v. Cent. Fla. Inv., Inc. 592 F.3d 1201, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010) (“In 
Exxon, the Supreme Court was quite explicit that it was dealing with maritime law, and not 
due process of law.”); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 905, 915 n.18 (N.D. Tex. 2008) 
(“Exxon Shipping was a maritime common law case, inapplicable here.”); Line v. Ventura, 38 
So.3d 1, 13 (Ala. 2009) (“We reject [the defendant’s] argument in light of the Baker Court’s 
explicit limitation of its holding to federal maritime common law.”); Modern Mgmt. Co. v. 
Wilson, 997 A.2d 37, 51 n.17 (D.C. 2010) (“We do not focus on Exxon in our analysis 
because the Court’s holding is limited to federal maritime cases.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 100 n.9 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (explaining that the Exxon “decision emphasized the dangers of unpredictable 
punitive damage awards” and “not[ing] that a bedrock principle of the rule of law is that like 
parties should be treated similarly”); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 484 
n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Although Exxon is a maritime law case, it is clear that the Supreme 
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argues that the Exxon decision has constitutional implications, but 
those implications are based in procedural due process.  
III. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Most of the challenges to punitive damage awards that the Court 
heard in the twenty years prior to Exxon were constitutionally based 
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. It states: “No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”55 
This Clause has been interpreted to include both procedural and 
substantive components.56  
These components are distinct, and the distinction matters, 
mostly because the effect of a substantive due process violation is 
relatively limited, whereas the effect of a procedural due process 
violation is far-reaching. Despite the distinction between the two 
components, the Court has often intertwined them in its punitive 
damages cases. Some intertwining is inevitable, given the relationship 
of the components. Reinforcing the distinction, however, reveals that 
the Court’s post-1993, due process-based punitive damages holdings 
have imposed substantive, and not procedural, limitations. 
A. The Difference Between Procedural and Substantive Due Process 
Procedural due process refers to procedures that the government 
must use when taking an action.57 “Classic procedural due process 
issues concern what kind of notice and what form of hearing the 
government must provide when it takes a particular action.”58 In 
addition to providing “citizens notice of what actions may subject 
them to punishment,” requiring certain procedures “also helps to 
assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons 
 
Court intends that its holding have a much broader application.”). 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 56. Not all Supreme Court Justices share the view that due process consists both of 
procedural and substantive components; Justice Scalia, for example, denies the existence of 
substantive due process. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598–99 
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing the validity of a procedural due process challenge to 
a punitive award, but no substantive due process basis).  
 57. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 523 (2d 
ed. 2002).  
 58. Id. 
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that is the essence of law itself.”59 If procedural due process is the 
only challenge to a particular action, then the State has the power to 
take that particular action, but procedural due process governs what 
procedures the State must follow in taking the action.  
Substantive due process, on the other hand, “asks whether the 
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, 
liberty or property” and, more plainly, “looks to whether there is a 
sufficient justification for the government’s action.”60 If a particular 
governmental action violated substantive due process, the procedures 
it used in taking that action are irrelevant because the State simply 
lacks power to take such an action.  
In reverse order, in the punitive damages context, substantive 
due process “imposes substantive limits ‘beyond which penalties may 
not go.’”61 Generally speaking, punitive damages serve and are 
justified by the State’s interests in punishment and deterrence. 
However, because the State’s interests are not limitless, a punitive 
award can be substantively unconstitutional if it does more than is 
justified by the State’s interests.62 Substantive due process review of a 
punitive damage award looks to whether the particular award is 
excessive, meaning it does more than is justified by the State’s 
interests in punishment and deterrence. If the award is excessive, it is 
unconstitutional, regardless of the procedures used in imposing it.63 
Procedural due process concerns about punitive damages are 
based on the procedures used in imposing the damages and are 
“typically concerned with giving fair notice and a fair hearing.”64 A 
punitive award may or may not be substantively excessive, but it is 
unconstitutional if imposed without proper procedures.65 
 
 59. BMW, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 524. 
 61. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (quoting 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)). 
 62. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (majority opinion). 
 63. See Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive 
Damages: Due Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1147, 
1152 (2008). 
 64. See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 400 (2008); Scheuerman & 
Franze, supra note 63, at 1152 (“Procedural due process requires that there be safeguards such 
as instructions to the jury to guide their discretion, and judicial review to ensure the 
reasonableness of the awards.”(quoting CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 523–24)). 
 65. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 52 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Even a wholly irrational process may, on occasion, stumble upon a fair result.”). 
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The consequences of substantive and procedural due process 
reviews of punitive damage awards also differ. If an award violates 
substantive due process, that specific award is unconstitutional; the 
consequences of the finding of constitutional invalidity are limited to 
that specific award. But if an award violates procedural due process, 
the specific award is unconstitutional—and “any award of punitive 
damages rendered under these procedures, no matter how small the 
amount, is constitutionally infirm.”66 A finding that an award violates 
procedural due process thus essentially mandates reform of 
procedures used in imposing punitive damages in general.67  
B. Classifying the Court’s Opinions as Procedural or Substantive 
The Court’s early punitive damage opinions reflect this 
distinction between procedural and substantive due process. Over 
time, however, the distinction became muddled and the two 
concepts have become almost intertwined in the Court’s decisions. 
This is not surprising because of the relationship between the two 
components. Reviewing the distinction reveals that the Court has 
relied only on substantive due process in invalidating punitive 
damage awards in its most recent cases.  
1. Early challenges based on procedural due process 
In Haslip,68 the Court heard its first procedural due process 
challenge to a punitive damage award and found no violation.69 The 
Court reviewed the common law method for assessing punitive 
damages, which empowers the jury to determine the amount of 
damages to be awarded, subject to review by the trial and appellate 
court.70 The Court noted that “unlimited jury discretion . . . in the 
fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s 
constitutional sensibilities.”71 But the instructions at issue, which 
explained that the purposes of punitive damages are “to punish the 
defendant” and to “protect[] the public by [deterring] the defendant 
 
 66. Id. at 43–44. 
 67. See id. at 64 (speculating that the majority in Haslip found no procedural due 
process violation “because it perceives that such a ruling would force us to evaluate the 
constitutionality of every State’s punitive damages scheme”). 
 68. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 69. See id. at 23–24. 
 70. See id. at 15. 
 71. Id. at 18. 
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and others from doing such wrong in the future,” and that the jury 
should consider the nature of the wrong in setting the amount of 
damages, sufficiently constrained the jury’s discretion.72 Evaluating 
the whole of all of the procedures in place, including appellate 
review,73 the Court found that the defendant “had the benefit of the 
full panoply of Alabama’s procedural protections” and thus 
determined no procedural due process violation occurred.74 
Justice O’Connor dissented, concluding that Alabama’s 
procedures violated procedural due process because they provided no 
“meaningful standards to guide the application of its laws.”75 Justice 
O’Connor explained that a basic purpose of procedural due process 
is to ensure that the government can impose burdens on people only 
in accordance with law, thus requiring that law include standards for 
enforcement and for determining consequences.76 Alabama’s jury 
instructions gave the jury discretion in awarding punitive damages 
and setting their amount, “but suggest[ed] no criteria on which to 
base the exercise of that discretion.”77 And any post-verdict review of 
the amount could not solve the problem because it would not test 
the procedures used to determine the amount.78  
Shortly after Haslip, the Court upheld another punitive damage 
award in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.79 The 
defendant made another procedural due process challenge, this time 
based on lack of fair notice—that the defendant lacked notice that 
the punitive award would end up being 526 times larger than the 
compensatory damage award.80 The Court concluded that the only 
notice required by procedural due process was of the possibility of 
damages; thus, notice of the possible punitive damage award due to 
the heightened culpability of the conduct satisfied the defendant’s 
due process rights.81 Justice O’Connor had already expressed her 
 
 72. Id. at 19 (second alteration in original). The instructions also told the jury to 
consider “the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of 
preventing similar wrong.” Id. 
 73. See id. at 20–21. 
 74. Id. at 23.  
 75. Id. at 44 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 45. 
 77. Id. at 44. 
 78. See id. at 43. 
 79. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
 80. Id. at 453. 
 81. Id. at 465–66. In 1994, the Court again addressed the procedural protections 
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disagreement with the distinction between notice of an award and 
notice of the amount of an award in Haslip, interpreting procedural 
due process to require notice of the amount.82  
2. Veering into substantive due process  
TXO also included a substantive due process challenge—that the 
award was excessive.83 Both sides presented possible tests to 
determine whether an award is excessive, but the Court refused to 
adopt either.84 The Court further explained that “[a]ssuming that 
fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of that 
process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”85 Although 
the Court did not do so, it noted that “there are persuasive reasons 
for suggesting that the presumption should be irrebuttable.”86 
Specific to the award, the Court noted that the 526:1 disparity 
between the punitive and compensatory damages was significant, but 
it was not that significant considering the potential harm the  
defendant’s conduct could have caused nonparties.87 In light of that 
potential harm, the award was not excessive and was constitutional.88  
 
necessary to protect a defendant’s rights in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 421 
(1994). The protection at issue was judicial review of a punitive award. Acknowledging that 
“[j]ury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts,” the 
Court found that “[j]udicial review of the amount awarded [is] one of the few procedural 
safeguards” that guards against the chance of juries basing awards on bias, emotion, or 
prejudice. Id. at 432. Thus, Oregon’s denial of judicial review of a punitive award violated the 
defendant’s procedural due process rights. Id. The Court’s last mention of procedural 
protections occurred in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, where the Court 
mandated de novo appellate review of punitive damage awards. 532 U.S. 424, 434–36 (2001). 
The Court made clear that this was required by procedural due process in State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).  
 82. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 44 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 83. Also evidencing the substantive due process basis of the challenge and opinion is 
Justice Scalia’s dissent. See supra note 56. Justice Scalia found no due process violation because 
the defendant received sufficient procedural protections. TXO, 509 U.S. at 470 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). He dissented because he does not believe that the Due Process Clause includes any 
substantive limitations on punitive damages. Id. (“I do not accept the proposition that [the 
Due Process Clause] is the secret repository of all sorts of other, unenumerated, substantive 
rights . . . .”). 
 84. TXO, 509 U.S. at 455–57 (majority opinion). 
 85. Id. at 457. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 460. 
 88. Id. at 462. 
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3. Intertwining the procedural and substantive due process issues 
After TXO, the due process basis of the Court’s holdings became 
less clear.89 The Court’s holdings in the ensuing cases included both 
procedural- and substantive-looking language.  
a. BMW—procedural or substantive? In 1996, the Court reversed 
a punitive damage award in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.90 
The jury had imposed a $4 million punitive damage award for the 
defendant’s failure to disclose minimal repairs done to a car that was 
sold as new; the compensatory damages awarded in the case were 
only $4000.91  
Besides being the Court’s first reversal of a punitive damage 
award, the most important development from BMW was the Court’s 
articulation of the three constitutional guideposts for use in 
reviewing punitive damage awards. According to the Court, the 
guideposts have dual purposes. First, analysis of the guideposts 
reviews whether an award is “grossly excessive” and too arbitrary to 
be constitutional92—a substantive due process question. Second, the 
analysis indicates whether the defendant “receive[d] fair notice not 
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of 
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose”93—a procedural 
due process question. Briefly, the three guideposts are: (1) the level 




 89. See Jeremy T. Adler, Losing the Procedural Battle but Winning the Substantive War: 
How Philip Morris v. Williams Reshaped Reprehensibility Analysis in Favor of Mass-Tort 
Plaintiffs, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 745 (2009) (“In the Court’s more recent punitive 
damages cases, the distinction between post-verdict substantive due process review of punitive 
damages awards and pre-verdict procedural due process requirements has often been far from 
clear.”); Scheuerman & Franze, supra note 63, at 1152, 1157–59 (explaining that “the Court 
itself has blended the concepts” of procedural and substantive due process); Neil Vidmar & 
Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instructions on Punitive Damages After 
Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 307, 320 (2008) (“[T]he distinction 
between procedural and substantive justice is sometimes elusive even to trained lawyers and 
judges . . . .”). 
 90. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 91. Id. at 565. 
 92. Id. at 574–75.   
 93. Id. at 574.  
 94. Id. at 575. 
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between the amount of punitive and compensatory damages,95 and 
(3) criminal and/or civil sanctions for comparable conduct.96  
Despite the mention of both due process concepts in the 
opinion, most commentators interpreted BMW as a substantive due 
process case for various reasons. 97 First, the opinion mentioned this 
procedural “fair notice . . . of the severity” language only once, in 
the same paragraph where it introduced the guideposts.98 After this 
mention, the Court did not return to procedural ideas. 
Second, the Court did not discuss any of the procedures that 
were in place in imposing the punitive award in BMW. Despite 
announcing a presumption of the substantive validity of a punitive 
award if proper procedures are in place in TXO, and even suggesting 
in TXO that the presumption be “irrebutable,”99 the BMW Court 
did not address how the procedures were insufficient, and instead 
skipped ahead to addressing the award itself. Justice Breyer wrote a 
separate concurrence, which Justices O’Connor and Souter joined, 
to explain why that presumption was overcome: “The standards the 
Alabama courts applied here are vague and open ended to the point 
where they risk arbitrary results. . . . [A]lthough the vagueness of 
those standards does not, by itself, violate due process, see 
Haslip, . . . it does invite the kind of scrutiny the Court has given the 
particular verdict before us.”100  
A third reason that negates the possibility of BMW being 
procedurally based is that the guideposts address only substantive 
 
 95. Id. at 580. The Court later mentioned that “single-digit ratio[s]” are most likely to 
comply with due process. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 
(2003). 
 96. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–84. 
 97. See Colby, supra note 64, at 403–04 (stating that “[t]he Court’s real problem with 
the punitive damages awarded in BMW was that it was too large, not that it was unexpected,” 
meaning that the damage award violated substantive due process); Anthony J. Franze & Sheila 
B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State 
Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 453 (2004) (describing BMW and the guideposts as based in 
substantive due process). Further support for the notion that BMW is a substantive due process 
case is found in the fact that Justice Scalia dissented because he disagreed with the majority’s 
use of substantive due process in the case. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing the validity of a procedural due process challenge to a punitive award but not a 
substantive due process basis). 
 98. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 (majority opinion). 
 99. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp. 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). 
 100. BMW, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring). As an example, Alabama’s jury 
instruction “does not itself contain a standard that readily distinguishes between conduct 
warranting very small, and conduct warranting very large, punitive damage awards.” Id.  
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concerns. As an initial matter, the guideposts are for use in post-
verdict review of punitive awards: “Post hoc review tests only the 
amount of the award, not the procedures by which that amount was 
determined.”101  
Additionally, the guideposts do not address fair notice. If notice 
were the issue, reprehensibility would be relevant because a 
defendant would likely be on notice that an award will be greater if 
conduct is highly reprehensible. The guidepost does not concern 
notice, however, and instead dictates that the amount of the award is 
substantively limited by the level of reprehensibility of the 
conduct.102 Similarly, if notice were the issue, the ratio guidepost 
would concern the defendant’s pre-existing knowledge of the 
punitive award’s likely ratio to the compensatory award or the 
amount of the compensatory award. But instead, the comparison  
matters only post-verdict; it looks at how much greater the punitive 
award is than the compensatory award.103  
The third guidepost, the criminal sanctions for comparable 
conduct, comes closest to reflecting notice concerns.104 But again, 
the guidepost focuses on substantive concerns—criminal sanctions 
are relevant because courts “should ‘accord substantial deference’ to 
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the 
conduct at issue.”105 The Court expanded on these substantive 
concerns in its next punitive damages case after BMW, State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell: “[t]he existence of a criminal 
penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a State 
 
 101. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 52–53 (explaining that post-verdict review “‘does not really address the issue’” of 
whether the procedures used to determine the amount of the award provided the defendant 
fair notice of the award ahead of time (quoting Charter Hosp. of Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 
558 So.2d 909, 915 (1990)). 
 102. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion). 
 103. See id. at 580–82 (explaining that a higher ratio may be appropriate if a “particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages” or if “the injury is 
hard to detect”); see also infra Part V.A.3 (arguing that using compensatory damages as the 
baseline allows only post-trial predictability). 
 104. Some notice-like language is included in this guidepost. The Court mentions 
criminal sanctions from other states and concludes that none of these out-of-state statutes 
would provide a defendant with “fair notice” of a “multimillion dollar penalty.” BMW, 517 
U.S. at 584.  
 105. Id. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
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views the wrongful action.”106 Criminal sanctions are relevant not 
because a defendant would expect an analogous punishment in the 
form of punitive damages, but because they provide a substantive 
comparison. 
Although the Court introduced the guideposts as resolving 
whether the defendant received fair notice of the likely severity of the 
punitive award, the guideposts really act only as a substantive 
limitation, just like the other limitations created in BMW and State 
Farm. Namely, in BMW, the Court created a substantive limitation 
by clarifying that a punitive award cannot punish a defendant for 
conduct committed in another state.107 In State Farm, the Court 
created an additional substantive limitation by clarifying that punitive 
damages cannot punish a defendant for conduct dissimilar to 
whatever the defendant did to the plaintiff.108 
b. Philip Morris—procedural or substantive? Just as in BMW, the 
Court integrated both substantive and procedural due process ideas 
in Philip Morris USA v. Williams.109 Philip Morris involved a punitive 
damage award that, conceivably, punished the defendant for harming 
non-parties—people other than the plaintiff—in the lawsuit. The 
Court found this to violate due process and spent much time crafting 
the holding as based in procedural due process: “We hold that such 
an award would amount to a taking of ‘property’ from the defendant 
without due process.”110 The solution, according to the Court, is 
 
 106. 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003). The Court focused only on the substantive differences 
between the amounts when comparing them: “The most relevant civil sanction under Utah 
state law for the wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of 
fraud[,] . . . an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.” Id. BMW and 
State Farm are the only two cases in which the Court has applied the guideposts in a 
constitutional review of a punitive award. 
 107. BMW, 517 U.S. at 572 (“We think it follows from these principles of state 
sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws 
with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”). The punitive 
damage award in TXO likely also encompassed punishment for out-of-state conduct because 
evidence of such conduct was introduced at trial. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
BMW likely overrules TXO in this respect.  
 108. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. 
 109. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 110. Id. at 349. Within its description of the constitutional limits of punitive damage 
awards, the Court specifically mentions procedural concerns: “Unless a State insists upon 
proper standards that will cabin the jury’s discretionary authority, its punitive damages system 
may deprive a defendant of ‘fair notice’ . . . of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose . . . .” Id. at 352 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 574). 
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some procedure to ensure that the jury does not punish the 
defendant for harming non-parties.111  
Despite the procedure-looking language in Phillip Morris, just as 
with BMW, many believe Philip Morris was based on substantive due 
process grounds—substantively prohibiting a punitive damage award 
from punishing the defendant for harm caused to nonparties.112 This 
interpretation is correct as none of the Court’s purported 
procedural-based problems hold up.  
If the constitutional problem with the award is that it was 
imposed using insufficient procedures, what process was lacking? 
One alleged absent protection was an opportunity for the defendant 
to defend itself against claims of harm to non-parties.113 The Court, 
however, pointed to no ruling by the trial court that practically 
precluded the defendant from presenting such evidence. Further, if 
this defect had been merely procedural, the Court should have 
remedied it by providing the defendant with the opportunity to 
defend itself against these claims. The Court’s solution, however, was 
to prohibit punishment for harming non-parties.  
Another procedural problem, according to the Court, was that 
“permit[ting] punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add 
a near standardless dimension” to the jury’s determination of the 
amount of punitive damages.114 This echoed early procedural due 
process concerns in Haslip regarding the amount of jury discretion in 
setting award amounts. Again, though, if this defect were 
procedural, the Court could have fixed it by requiring the lower 
court to define limits within which nonparty victims could be 
considered. Instead, the Court prohibited any punishment for 
harming non-parties.  
 
 
 111. Id. at 357. 
 112. See Adler, supra note 89, at 745 (arguing for a substantive due process component 
of the Philip Morris decision); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Constitution and 
Fundamental Rights, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, at xii (2007) (listing Philip Morris as a 
substantive due process case); Keith N. Hylton, Due Process and Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Approach, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 371 (2008) (explaining that Philip Morris 
imposes a substantive limit and that “[t]he use of procedural due process language . . . was 
somewhat inappropriate and at worst insincere”); Scheuerman & Franze, supra note 63, at 
1150, 1157–59 (describing the Philip Morris decision as imposing a substantive limit on 
punitive damages). 
 113. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353–54. 
 114. Id. at 354. 
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A more general, notice-based procedural concern would be that 
the defendant lacked notice that the punitive award could include 
punishment for conduct to non-parties. But this defendant had such 
notice. That is why the defendant asked for a jury instruction 
prohibiting punishment for harm to non-parties.115 The problem in 
Philip Morris could not be lack of notice. 
Therefore, none of the Court’s purported procedural due process 
bases hold water. While the appeal was based on the refusal of a jury 
instruction prohibiting punishment for harming non-parties, this lack 
of instruction was simply the method of preserving trial error for 
appeal.116 Although the Court’s holding mandates a jury 
instruction,117 the involvement of a jury instruction does not always 
implicate a procedural due process basis. Just as in BMW, despite the 
procedure-looking language, Philip Morris was based on substantive 
due process.    
4. Why the intertwining of procedural and substantive due process?  
There are multiple possible explanations for the Court’s 
intertwining of procedural and substantive due process. A cynical 
possibility is that the Court does not want to invoke substantive due 
process any more than necessary.118 Perhaps the procedural due 
 
 115. Id. at 350–51. 
 116. Arguably, the defendant did not properly preserve its error for appeal. See id. at 
362–63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 356–57 (majority opinion) (holding that jury instructions must tell a jury that 
it cannot “punish for the harm caused others”); see also Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The 
Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 588 
(2011) (concluding that Philip Morris is based on procedural due process because Justice 
Kennedy “is talking about how the jury reached its decision on the punitive damages award (i.e. 
what evidence the jury was allowed to consider), rather than how big the award was”). 
Professor Gash’s conclusion is based on Justice Kennedy’s statement that “[d]ue process does 
not permit courts . . . to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims . . . [because 
it] creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.” Id. 
(quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003)).  Although the 
quote discusses the possibility that the jury may have considered other potential claims against 
the defendant, Justice Kennedy’s discussion may have also been based on the substantive limits 
of punitive damages—they must be personalized to what the defendant did to the specific 
plaintiff, and inclusion of punishment for harm to nonparties is thus excessive.  
 118. See Colby, supra note 64, at 401–05 (explaining that the Court intentionally 
disguises substantive due process decisions as procedural due process decisions because it is 
“ashamed of the substantive due process doctrine’s very existence”); see also Vikram David 
Amar, Business and Constitutional Originalism in the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
979, 982–83 (2009) (suggesting that labeling Philip Morris as procedural, “(not quite 
convincing, to me at least),” swayed Justices Roberts and Alito to join the opinion and “to 
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process “fair notice” language in BMW legitimizes the substantive 
due process holding.  
The more likely reason why the Court has intertwined the two 
violations, however, is that they are obviously related. Every 
substantive due process violation likely involves a procedural issue. In 
BMW, the Court was clearly concerned about the amount of the 
punitive award and its encompassing punishment for out-of-state 
conduct,119 but these issues necessarily also involved “how the jury 
reached its punitive damages award,” which is procedural.120 In State 
Farm, punishing for dissimilar conduct violated substantive due 
process,121 but the case also necessarily involved procedures because 
no jury instruction prohibited the jury from punishing the defendant 
for dissimilar conduct. In Philip Morris, the punitive award may have 
punished the defendant for harming non-parties, a possibility given  
that no jury instruction prohibited it.122 Substantive violations are 
more likely to occur if no procedure is in place to prevent them.123 
Similarly, all substantive due process violations are necessarily 
fixed through procedures.124 As Justice Thomas explained in his 
Philip Morris dissent, a “procedural rule is simply a confusing 
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has 
created for punitive damages.”125  
The Court has developed a pattern of announcing a substantive 
restriction in one case and then mandating the jury instruction to 
 
sleep a little easier”); David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the 
Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1038–39 
(2009) (“Perhaps in order to keep the Chief Justice and Justice Alito from defecting, Justice 
Breyer took [great] pains in Philip Morris to ground his opinion in the procedural rather than 
the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause . . . .”).  
 119. See supra notes 90–107 and accompanying text. 
 120. Gash, supra note 117, at 586. 
 121. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. 
 122. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 351.        
 123. Conversely, substantive due process violations are less likely to occur if the 
procedures in place are proper. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
457 (1993) (“Assuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of 
that process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”).  
 124. See Scheuerman & Franze, supra note 63, at 1159–60 (stating that Philip Morris 
mandated the adoption of “procedural protections” to limit the chance of using the 
defendant’s harming non-parties as a basis of punishment in punitive damage awards); see also 
Colby, supra note 64, at 405–06 (illustrating that the Constitution provides a substantive free 
speech right in defamation cases through a jury instruction prohibiting liability without 
evidence of actual malice). 
 125. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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help ensure that restriction in the next case. For example, in State 
Farm, the Court mandated that jury instructions inform the jury that 
it cannot punish the defendant for its out-of-state conduct,126 the 
substantive limitation created in BMW.127 Similarly, Philip Morris 
mandated that lower courts adopt some procedural protections to 
prevent punitive damages from encompassing the defendant’s harm 
to nonparties,128 another substantive limitation on punitive damages 
arguably created in State Farm.129 These proper procedures will 
(hopefully) prevent the substantive due process violation; once the 
jury is instructed that it cannot punish the defendant for its out-of-
state conduct, the punitive damage award should not include 
punishment for such conduct. Practically, if the jury is so instructed, 
it should be difficult for the defendant to show on appeal that an 
award included punishment for out-of-state conduct.130  
A possible test to tell the difference between a substantive- and 
procedural-based limitation is to focus on why the award is 
problematic. Is it because it punishes something it should not? Put 
another way, ask if the punitive damage award would be permissible 
if the defendant were on notice of what the punitive damage award 
would encompass. For instance, if a defendant were on notice that a 
punitive award would encompass punishment for dissimilar conduct 
and the defendant had an opportunity to try to mitigate evidence of 
that conduct, would the award still violate the defendant’s rights? If 
so, the dissimilar conduct issue is substantive.  
 
 
 126. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422 (“A jury must be instructed, furthermore, that it may 
not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the 
jurisdiction where it occurred.”); see also Scheuerman & Franze, supra note 63, at 1154 (“State 
Farm did not explicitly direct that all of the substantive limits be provided to the jury.”). 
 127. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). 
 128. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 355 (majority opinion).  
 129. See Adler, supra note 89, at 745 (“When the Court in Philip Morris contemplated 
whether a jury could directly punish for potential harm to nonparties, the Court looked to 
State Farm (a substantive due process decision) . . . .”); Sheila B. Scheuermann, Two Worlds 
Collide: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Punitive Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 
BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 902 (2008) (interpreting State Farm as “suggest[ing] that it was 
improper to punish for harm to others”).   
 130. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456–57 (1993) 
(“Assuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of that process 
[the process of a jury award that includes the selection of impartial jurors, collective 
deliberation of the jurors based on evidence presented through the judicial process, a trial 
judge upholding the award, and the State Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously affirming 
the award] is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”). 
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Applying this test to the punitive award in Philip Morris, which 
conceivably included punishment for harm to nonparties,131 is 
illustrative. If the defendant had been given notice that it could be 
punished for harming nonparties, and had the opportunity to defend 
itself against allegations of harming nonparties, would an award 
encompassing injury to non-parties violate the defendant’s rights? 
Such notice would fix any procedural due process problem. 
Nevertheless, the defendant’s substantive due process rights would 
still be violated—the award still punishes the defendant for injury to 
non-parties. Philip Morris substantively prohibits this multiple 
punishment possibility notwithstanding sufficient notice.132 
Regardless of the clarity of the procedural protections, the State’s 
interests do not justify punishing a defendant for harming 
nonparties.  
This example illustrates that the procedural and substantive 
limitations on punitive damage awards are not difficult to distinguish 
if one focuses on why the award is problematic by pretending that 
the defendant was on notice of the alleged defect. And it is 
important to make the distinction because of the consequences 
resulting from the two different violations. If only a substantive 
violation occurred, the punitive award at issue is unconstitutional. If 
instead a procedural violation occurred, not only is the award at issue 
unconstitutional, but any award issued under those procedures is also 
unconstitutional.133  
 
 131. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 355. 
 132. See id. at 35657 (explaining that the defendant in Philip Morris arguably had this 
notice, which explains why it requested a jury instruction to preclude the possibility of 
punishment for harming nonparties).  
 133. The distinction also has practical implications. First, certain members of the Court 
might be willing to entertain true procedural due process challenges but not substantive due 
process violations—mainly Justices Scalia and Thomas. Second, Professor Jim Gash recently 
suggested that the Court may not be willing to hear future substantive due process claims. See 
Gash, supra note 117 at 584–89; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Wyeth LLC v. 
Scofield, 131 S. Ct. 3028 (2011) (No. 10-1177), 2011 WL 1155235, at *31 (“Members of 
this Court have famously expressed divergent views as to the propriety of reviewing the 
excessiveness of punitive damages.”). The Court’s disinclination to further substantive due 
process review of punitive damages is not as powerful as it seems, however, given that the 
Court can easily recraft a substantive due process violation into a procedural due process 
violation—as it did in Philip Morris. See supra Part III.B.3.b. But if Professor Gash is correct 
and the Court is disinclined to further substantive due process review, then review of any 
awards imposed under proper procedures is precluded. This returns the Court to a 
presumption of the validity of an award if imposed under proper procedures. See TXO, 509 
U.S. at 457 (“Assuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of 
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 11:27 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
24 
Careful examination of the distinction between the procedural 
and substantive based limitations also reveals that the Court had not 
heard a procedural due process-based challenge to common law  
punitive damage jury instructions for almost twenty years. That 
changed in Exxon.  
IV. EXXON AS A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS HOLDING 
Forget what you know about Exxon. Now pretend that you were 
told that the Court declared that punitive damages are too 
unpredictable and that the Court wants reform so that potential 
tortfeasors can know the consequences of their behavior. What 
would you guess is the basis of the opinion? Probably not maritime 
law. 
The obvious choice is procedural due process—the law that 
guarantees fair notice. Exxon predictability is no different than the 
fair notice that procedural due process requires; both concepts 
originate from the rule of law and require the same extent of notice. 
Exxon builds on the Court’s prior procedural due process holdings. 
In Exxon, the Court concluded that generalized, common law jury 
instructions cannot produce predictable punitive damage awards. 
Necessarily, the same instructions cannot produce awards consistent 
with the fair notice of severity that procedural due process requires. 
To achieve the required predictability, Exxon suggests a pegging 
solution.  
A. Whatever Exxon Is, It’s Not Maritime Law 
In Exxon, the Court states that it is “reviewing a jury award for 
conformity with maritime law.”134 But very little of the opinion itself 
even mentions maritime law, much less analyzes it. From the very 
beginning of the punitive damages analysis, the Court explains that 
the case requires it to explore its “understanding of the place of 
punishment in modern civil law and reasonable standards of process 
in administering punitive law”135—as opposed to the place of 
punishment in modern maritime law.  
 
that process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”).   
 134. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008).  
 135. Id. at 490 (emphasis added); see also Jeff Kerr, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The 
Perils of Judicial Punitive Damages Reform, 59 EMORY L.J. 727, 758 (2010) (explaining that 
the Court did not cite to “maritime cases or principles”). 
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The analysis then turns to the history of punitive damages in all 
cases.136 The Court mentions the overall higher frequency of punitive 
awards in the United States as compared to England, Canada, and 
Australia,137 and also mentions that American punitive damages are 
the target of criticism.138 The Court then reviews studies of all 
punitive damage awards and declares them to be starkly 
unpredictable.139 The Court offers anecdotal evidence of two cases 
with strikingly similar facts producing vastly different punitive 
awards.140 These cases were not based on maritime law.141  
The Court explains that unpredictability is problematic because 
“[c]ourts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency,”142 and 
because of the “unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict 
carries in a system whose commonly held notion of law rests on a 
sense of fairness in dealing with one another.”143 These courts of law 
and the system to which the Court referred are not limited to 
maritime law. Also, the Court does not mention that concerns about 
predictability, fairness, or consistency are somehow heightened in 
maritime law.144 
In evaluating possible reforms, the Court first reviews jury 
instructions. The examples included in the opinion are state law 
instructions.145 Maritime law is federal law, and federal circuits have 
patterned punitive damage jury instructions for maritime law,146 but 
the Court did not evaluate those. The Court reviewed the possibility 
of setting hard caps on punitive damages, but declined to do so 
partly because no “standard” tort injury exists, something that 
should not have hampered the Court in defining maritime law 
violations.147 The Court settled on a 1:1 ratio of punitive to 
 
 136. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 490. 
 137. Id. at 49697. 
 138. Id. at 497. 
 139. Id. at 499. 
 140. Id. at 500. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 499. 
 143. Id. at 502. 
 144. Id. at 471–75. But see Kerr, supra note 135 at 76667, for a discussion that these 
concerns are heightened in maritime law. 
 145. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 50304. 
 146. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL NO. 4.10 (2006); 11TH 
CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL NO. 6.1 (2005). 
 147. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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compensatory damages based on that ratio’s proximity to the median 
in studies of punitive damage awards imposed in state courts.148 
Because maritime law is federal law,149 these studies likely did not 
include maritime law cases.150  
Aside from introducing the case as being based in maritime law, 
the Court mentions maritime law just twice. One mention is that 
Clean Water Act daily fines confirm the propriety of the 1:1 punitive 
to compensatory damages ratio.151 The second mention is to explain 
its active involvement in developing maritime law and thus justify its 
setting the 1:1 limit instead of Congress.152 Neither of these 
mentions is relevant to unpredictability analysis, and they do little to 
convince the reader of a maritime law basis. The Exxon Court’s 
purported maritime law basis for its concern about unpredictability is 
nonsensical.  
B. Predictability Is No Different than Procedural Due Process 
Unpredictability is not problematic because of maritime law — it 
is problematic because of procedural due process. “Unpredictability 
 
 148. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 51213.  
 149. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over common law maritime law cases. 28 
U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). In 1915, Congress passed the Jones Act, which provided a negligence 
cause of action for seamen who suffer personal injuries. A seaman’s claim based on the Jones 
Act may be brought in state court, and the defendant’s ability to remove is limited to preserve 
the seaman’s forum choice. 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3677 (4th ed. 2011). 
 150. Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 2008 WL 4926925, at *12 n.13 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2008) (“It is noted that although the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping 
concerned federal maritime law, the Court reached its holding by analyzing and relying on 
punitive awards in state court civil trials.”). The types of cases included in the study cited by 
the Court in Exxon do not seem to include any based in maritime law. See Theodore Eisenberg 
et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of 
State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 27880 (2006); 
see also THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL 
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE 
COUNTIES, 2001 (2004); CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1996: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND 
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (1999); STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE 
COUNTIES 6 (1995).   
 151. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 51314. 
 152. Id. at 508 n.21 (explaining that “modern-day maritime cases . . . support judicial 
action to modify a common law landscape largely of our [the Court’s] own making” despite 
Congress’s involvement in creating maritime law remedies). 
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is fundamentally a procedural complaint.”153 Although not expressly 
making a procedural due process argument, even the defendant in 
Exxon recognized this, citing Haslip in its predictability discussion.154 
Both procedural due process and Exxon predictability originate from 
the rule of law ideal. To fulfill that ideal, both procedural due 
process and predictability mandate that a defendant be provided fair 
notice of the likely amount of the punitive award.  
1. Origins in the rule of law 
The classic conception of the “rule of law” is encapsulated in the 
phrase “a government of laws, and not of men.”155 The essence of 
this phrase is that “something other than the mere will of the 
individuals deputized to exercise government powers must have 
primacy,” and that something is laws.156  
Not just any laws will do, however. The laws must be “in a form 
that does instruct”157 and must be predictable so that they “provide 
the keys to their effectuation.”158 The predictability of laws enables 
people to foresee how the government will act under circumstances, 
enabling people to plan their lives consistent (or inconsistent) with 
the rules.159 The predictability envisioned in the rule of law is not 
 
 153. Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA 
L. REV. 1, 16 (2009). 
 154. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 
(2007) (No. 07-219), 2007 WL 2383784, at *25 (“[T]he same considerations of ‘size and 
recurring unpredictability’ have led state courts and legislatures to impose caps should lead the 
Court to set a limit here.” (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring))). The relevant question posed in the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari 
stated: “Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of all 
punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal courts in our history, within the limits allowed 
by . . . constitutional due process?” Id. at i. Although the question does not mention 
“substantive,” it references the size of the award, which is a substantive concern. Also, the 
argument within the petition focuses on excessiveness because the amount of fines and costs 
already imposed on the defendant had fulfilled the state’s interests in punishment and 
deterrence. Id. at 27. Similarly, the defendant argued that the Ninth Circuit erred in applying 
the constitutional guideposts, which are substantive limitations. Id. at 2830.  
 155. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 2 (John Hopkins Univ. Press 
2001) (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780).  
 156. Id. at 3. 
 157. Id. at 5. 
 158. Id. at 7. 
 159. Id. at 7, 8 (explaining that the rule of law enables “a knowledgeable party to 
anticipate the manner in which a rule will be applied without knowing particulars about the 
individuals who will interpret and enforce the law”); id. at 11 (explaining that rule of law 
“allow[s] individuals to plan their lives”); JOSE MARIA MARAVALL & ADAM PRZEWORSKI, 
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exact, but sufficient to enable this planning.160 Also necessary to 
predictability is that the laws be general and neutral.161 General laws 
apply not only to individual cases, but to entire classes of cases.162 
Neutral laws apply to everyone in the same way.163  
Another characteristic of predictability is that the law must be 
external so that each public official is bound by it.164 Again, the 
decision should not change depending on the decision maker. Aside 
from enhancing predictability, the externality of law increases 
legitimacy because the decision maker is not able to “define the 
scope of the power to be exercised and the terms on which it is being 
exercised.”165 People trust the government more knowing that its 
power is confined by external authority, and that trust better enables 
the government to function.166  
The predictability envisioned in the rule of law concept is the 
same end that both procedural due process and Exxon predictability 
attempt to achieve. One way procedural due process does so is the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine, which requires specificity in laws.167 
This specificity provides “fair warning to the public regarding what 
conduct may trigger government intrusion.”168 Without this 
specificity, the result of enforcement of laws would be unpredictable 
 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 2 (2003) ( “[The] rule of law makes it possible for 
people to predict the consequences of their actions and, hence, to plan their lives.”); Darryl K. 
Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1169 (1997) 
(“[C]itizens must be able to understand what the law requires in order to structure their 
private behavior in accordance with it.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of 
Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (explaining that conceptions of the rule of law emphasize 
predictability and that predictability enables freedom because “[k]nowing in advance how the 
law will operate enables one to plan around its requirements”). 
 160. CASS, supra note 155, at 11. 
 161. Id. at 9. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 10. 
 164. Id. at 17 (“The assurance that any official decision maker will comply with externally 
generated authority should tend to increase predictability.”). 
 165. Id. at 18. 
 166. Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 159, at 40 (“[I]t makes a difference if the public believes that rules are being 
enforced fairly . . . .”). 
 167. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1510 
(2007) (describing the void-for-vagueness doctrine as the courts’ response to the “legislative 
circumvention of the rule of law through vaguely defined crimes”). 
 168. Id. at 1511. 
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and citizens would be unable “to order their behavior”169 
accordingly. The same lack of specificity and resulting 
unpredictability also hurts the legitimacy of the law. 
Exxon similarly seeks predictability.170 Justice Souter’s description 
of predictability in Exxon specifically seeks to enable a potential 
tortfeasor to look ahead “with some ability to know what the stakes 
are in choosing one course of action or another.”171 Indeed, Justice 
Souter wants the next potential tortfeasor to know that she will face 
a similar punishment if she acts similarly.172 Only once potential 
tortfeasors have this information will they be able to plan their lives 
accordingly.  Such predictability should also improve the legitimacy 
of the punitive damages system, which the Exxon Court notes is 
heavily criticized.173     
2. Procedural due process and Exxon require the same extent of notice  
To fulfill their rule of law origins, procedural due process and 
Exxon predictability necessarily both require notice of the likely 
amount of the punitive award. Without notice of the likely amount, 
citizens would lack fair warning of the extent of the likely 
governmental response to tortious conduct. Similarly, without notice 
of the likely amount, citizens would be unable to make intelligent 
decisions because of their inability to weigh the stakes of those 
decisions.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that procedural due process 
requires notice of the likely amount.  The Court dictates that citizens 
are entitled to two-fold fair notice — “not only of the conduct that 
will subject [them] to punishment, but also of the severity of the 
 
 169. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Professor Fisher also noted the connection between procedural due process and the rule of law. 
See Fisher, supra note 153, at 19 (“The Due Process Clause—indeed, the rule of law itself—
requires civil . . . punishment to be regularized.”).  
 170. Justice Breyer noted the connection between Exxon and the rule of law in his 
concurrence. “Like the Court, I believe there is a need, grounded in the rule of law itself, to 
assure that punitive damages are awarded according to meaningful standards that will provide 
notice of how harshly certain acts will be punished and that will help to assure the uniform 
treatment of similarly situated persons.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 525 
(2008) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 171. Id. at 502 (majority opinion). 
 172. Id. 
 173.  Id. at 497. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 11:27 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
30 
penalty that a State may impose.”174 Notice of possible punishment 
alone would not fulfill the purpose of procedural due process, to 
allow people to order their behavior, especially given the 
inconsistency in the amounts of punitive damage awards.175 
Moreover, notice of possible punishment alone would not fulfill 
procedural due process’s rule of law origins.  Procedural due process 
must also require that a person be given fair notice of the likely 
severity of the award, meaning its amount. Only then are citizens 
truly provided fair warning of the likely government response. 
Specific to Exxon predictability, the Court also envisions 
defendants being able to predict the amount of the punitive award. 
Only then would defendants be able to, practically, understand the 
stakes of a decision to commit tortious conduct. The fact that the 
Court envisions defendants being able to predict the amounts of the 
awards is also evidenced by the Court’s emphasis on the 
unpredictable amounts of punitive damages.  
True, the language of what procedural due process and Exxon 
predictability require differs. Procedural due process requires “fair 
notice of severity” and Exxon refers to predictability. Historically, 
however, the Court has often referred to “predictability” within 
procedural due process contexts. In Haslip, a procedural due process 
case, the Court cited to previous Supreme Court opinions in which it 
had labeled punitive damages as “unpredictable,”176 and referred to 
the damages as “wholly unpredictable amounts.”177 Similarly, Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent noted the connection between procedural due 
process and predictability—that common law jury instructions 
produce “unpredictable results” and that reforms required by 
procedural due process would make damages more predictable.178 
 
 
 174. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
 175. Professor Cass discusses the possible inconsistencies between the rule of law concept 
and the current punitive damage system. See CASS, supra note 155, at 119–30. He believes that 
the current punitive damage system is “cause for concern” because of its seemingly inconsistent 
results. Id. at 99, 124. As an example, he points to BMW of North America v. Gore, which 
resulted in a $4 million punitive award, and another case with similar facts that resulted in no 
punitive damages. Id. at 124. The Court also pointed to these cases in Exxon. See infra Part 
IV.B.3. Justice O’Connor similarly pointed to inconsistent punitive damage awards in similar 
cases in her Haslip dissent. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61–62 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).    
 176. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 12 (majority opinion) (quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 
453 U.S. 247, 270–71 (1981); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). 
 177. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at  350). 
 178. Id. at 49, 59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Plus, predictability and fair notice of severity are really the same 
thing; one is not possible without the other. Fair notice of severity, 
as required by procedural due process, can exist only if the award is 
predictable, as envisioned in Exxon. If the award is predictable, then 
the defendant had fair notice of its severity; if unpredictable, fair 
notice of severity is impossible. One cannot achieve a system that 
produces punitive awards of which the defendant would have notice 
without also achieving a system that produces predictable punitive 
awards. Logically, one can only have notice of the amount of an 
award if the award is predictable. 
C. Do Common Law Jury Instructions Violate Procedural Due Process? 
Despite their similar origins and required extent of notice, there 
is a conceptual problem with thinking of Exxon predictability as 
based in procedural due process. In Haslip, the Court determined 
that common law jury instructions do not violate procedural due 
process. If predictability is the same as procedural due process, the 
Court in the Exxon decision should similarly have found no problem 
with common law jury instructions. Obviously though,  the Court 
did find a problem with the instructions —that they cannot produce 
predictable punitive damage awards. The easy answer to this 
conceptual problem is that the Court’s interpretation of what 
procedural due process’s fair notice component requires in the 
punitive damages context has changed since Haslip; the result in 
Exxon reflects that change. 
Haslip and TXO were the last Supreme Court cases in which a 
defendant challenged jury instructions and other procedures in place 
based on procedural due process.179 In both cases, the Court found 
no violation. But in both cases, the Court assumed that “the notice 
component of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly 
indicated that a punitive damages award might be imposed in 
response to egregiously tortious conduct.”180 Procedures to provide 
 
 179. In Haslip, the defendant argued that it lacked fair notice of the penalty and that the 
jury instructions were “hopelessly vague as to (i) under what circumstances punishment is 
deserved, (ii) the relative degree of punishment to be imposed, and (iii) the range within which 
punishment might properly be imposed.” Brief for Petitioner, Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (No. 89-
1279), 1990 WL 511306, at *9–10. Similarly, in TXO, the defendant complained that its 
procedural due process rights were violated because it lacked “advance notice that the jury 
might be allowed to return such a large award.” TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443, 463 (1993). 
 180. TXO, 509 U.S. at 465–66. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 11:27 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
32 
notice of the severity, i.e., the amount of damages, were not 
required.  
This is no longer good law. BMW expressly states that procedural 
due process requires procedures providing notice of the severity of 
the award.181 The Court said the same in Philip Morris: “[u]nless a 
State insists upon proper standards that will cabin the jury’s 
discretionary authority, its punitive damages system may deprive a 
defendant” of the required fair notice of the extent of the penalty.182 
This change from notice of the possibility of a punitive award to 
notice of the likely amount of the award is necessitated by procedural 
due process’s rule of law origins.183  
 Although BMW announced this change and Philip Morris 
confirmed it, neither of these cases, was based in procedural due 
process.184 Thus, the Court as a whole has never addressed expressly 
whether common law jury instructions are consistent with the fair 
notice of likely severity of an award that procedural due process 
requires.  
 One Justice has, however. In her Haslip dissent, Justice 
O’Connor viewed procedural due process as requiring notice of both 
the possibility and severity of punitive damages, as the Court now 
does. Using this view, Justice O’Connor, and found a procedural 
due process violation because no procedure sufficiently cabined the 
jury’s discretion.185 She explained that the jury instructions’  
vague references to “the character and degree of the wrong” and 
the “necessity of preventing similar wrong” do not assist the jury in 
making a reasoned decision; they are too amorphous. They restate  
 
 181. BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).    
 182. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007).  
 183. See discussion supra Part IV.B. The Court did not explain why it changed its stance 
on what procedural due process requires, nor did the Court even acknowledge a change 
occurred. In BMW, the Court explained that “[e]lementary notions of fairness” require fair 
notice of the severity of the penalty. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574. As authority, the Court cited 
multiple criminal cases involving procedural due process violations based on a defendant’s lack 
of notice of the extent of a penalty. Id. at 574 n.22. The Court explained that “[t]he strict 
constitutional safeguards afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil cases, but 
the basic protection against ‘judgments without notice’ afforded by the Due Process Clause . . 
. is implicated by civil penalties.” Id. Why the Court did not feel the same in Haslip and TXO is 
unknown, but the only way to fulfill the rule-of-law purposes of procedural due process is to 
interpret fair notice to include notice of the likely amount of the penalty.   
 184. See supra Part III.B.3.a–b.   
 185. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 44 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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the overarching principles of punitive damages —to punish and 
deter—without adding any meaning to these terms.186  
She also explained that Alabama’s jury instructions 
“encourage[d] . . . unpredictable results.”187 
Justice O’Connor’s Haslip dissent also noted the inconsistency in 
punitive awards resulting from the inadequate procedures. As 
described by Justice O’Connor, Alabama’s system “impos[ed] 
disproportionate punishment and . . . subject[ed] defendants guilty 
of similar misconduct to wholly different punishments.”188 As 
evidence of this disproportionate punishment, Justice O’Connor 
pointed to anecdotal evidence of two Alabama cases involving 
substantially similar misrepresentations regarding insurance coverage 
and involving comparable compensatory damages.189 Despite the 
similarities, one jury awarded $21,000 in punitive damages and 
another awarded $2.49 million.190 Any actual consistency among  
punitive awards produced through Alabama’s system was, according 
to Justice O’Connor, “purely fortuitous.”191  
Under the guise of maritime law, the Exxon Court revisited this 
question of whether common law jury instructions, including the 
very same Alabama instruction that Justice O’Connor examined,192 
sufficiently cabin the jury’s discretion and produce punitive awards in 
amounts of which defendants have fair notice. The Exxon Court 
substituted the word “predictability” for procedural due process’s 
 
 186. Id. at 48. 
 187. Id. at 43. 
 188. Id. at 59; see also id. (explaining that the state has “no legitimate interest in 
maintaining in pristine form a common-law system that imposes disproportionate punishment 
and that subjects defendants guilty of similar misconduct to wholly different punishments”). 
 189. Id. at 50. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 51. 
 192. The instruction was Alabama’s, telling the jury to consider “the character and 
degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence, and [the] necessity of preventing similar 
wrong” in determining the amount of damages. Id. at 48; see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008).  Jury instructions have not changed much since Haslip. As 
of 2008, ten states “continue to use model instructions comparable to the ‘skeletal guidance’ 
approved . . . in Haslip.” Scheuermann & Franze, supra note 63, at 1169. These traditional 
common law instructions detail the purposes of punishment and deterrence purposes of 
punitive damages and do little else. Also as of 2008, another eight states use instructions very 
similar to those approved in Haslip and also allow the jury to consider the defendant’s wealth. 
Id. at 1170–75. Over thirty states use tests instructing the jury to consider multiple factors, 
many of which are related to the constitutional guideposts. Id. at 1176–88.   
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“fair notice of the severity” language and, like Justice O’Connor, 
answered no.  
Justice O’Connor’s Haslip dissent looks like a blueprint for the 
Exxon majority opinion. Like Justice O’Connor, the majority in 
Exxon concluded that jury instructions like the ones at issue in 
Haslip, which explain the purposes of punitive damages, do not lead 
to predictable punitive damage awards.193 The majority in Exxon also 
noted the resulting inconsistency: juries are not producing “fairly 
consistent results in cases with similar facts.”194 As evidence of this 
inconsistency, Justice Souter—exactly like Justice O’Connor almost 
twenty years before—pointed to anecdotal evidence. This time, 
Justice Souter looked to the BMW case, where the jury imposed $4 
million in punitive damages.195 A “second Alabama case with 
strikingly similar facts produced ‘a comparable amount of 
compensatory damages’ but ‘no punitive damages at all.’”196 There is 
little doubt that the Exxon majority would agree with Justice  
O’Connor’s conclusion in Haslip that any actual consistency among 
punitive awards is because of dumb luck.197  
The ability of common law jury instructions to cabin the jury’s 
discretion marks the one place that the Exxon majority departs from 
Justice O’Connor’s Haslip dissent. Justice O’Connor was optimistic 
and believed that jury instructions could be reformed to solve the 
problem and “assist juries to make fair, rational decisions.”198 After 
almost twenty years of states’ experimentation with punitive damage 
jury instructions, no such optimism is present in Exxon. Officially, 
the Exxon Court abandoned hope “that verbal formulations, 
superimposed on general jury instructions are the best insurance 
against unpredictable outliers. Instructions can go just so far in 
promoting system consistency when awards are not tied to 
 
 193. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 499.    
 194. Id. at 500. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. 
 197. The Court also noted that it was not aware of any scholarly work showing 
consistency among punitive awards. Id. at 501. 
 198. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 52 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Specifically, she advocated that the jury should be instructed on various factors—the amount of 
harm the defendant’s conduct caused, the degree of reprehensibility, any profit motive, the 
defendant’s financial position, the costs of litigation, any criminal sanctions imposed on the 
defendant, and any other civil actions against the defendant for the same conduct. Id. at 51–
52.   
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specifically proven items of damage (the cost of medical treatment, 
say) . . . .”199  
If state common law punitive damage jury instructions are 
incapable of cabining the jury’s discretion enough to produce 
punitive awards that are predictable to the defendant, it is difficult to 
see how the same instructions sufficiently cabin the jury’s discretion 
to produce awards of which the defendant had notice—the fair 
notice of severity that procedural due process requires. Practically, 
that seems impossible.200 If jury instructions are incapable of 
producing predictable awards, as the Court clearly concluded in 
Exxon, then they also cannot produce awards at a severity level of 
which the defendant had notice—thus violating procedural due 
process.201 
D. Exxon’s Solution to Achieve Predictability (Fair Notice of the 
Severity) 
After rejecting the possibility of jury instructions producing 
predictable punitive awards, the Court narrowed down the possible 
reforms to one—pegging punitive damages to compensatory 
damages. The appropriate multiple of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages depends on the facts of the case. In Exxon, 
the defendant was not malicious or financially motivated.202 The 
 
 199. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 504; see also Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal 
Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 
156 (2008) (“Although instructions play a valuable role in guiding the jury’s determination of 
the punishment that the misconduct deserves and can focus the jury on the relevant factors 
that affect the amount of punishment, jury instructions do not limit the amount of a punitive 
damages award in the absence of a cap.”). 
 200. See Fisher, supra note 153, at 18 (“To be sure, the Court did not expressly hold that 
the Due Process Clause, as opposed to maritime law, forbids all ‘outlier’ punitive awards 
imposed under the common law system. But the Court expressly built on its due process 
holdings in BMW and State Farm.”). The Court does explain in Exxon that predictability-
based restrictions are “more rigorous” than the constitutional limit. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 506.  
 201. Professor Fisher argues that the Exxon regularization of punishment mandate applies 
to both civil and criminal punishment, meaning states are constitutionally required to adopt 
something similar to the federal sentencing guidelines. Fisher, supra note 153, at 42–46 
(explaining his purpose is “simply to point out that it should be hard for the Court to avoid 
applying its new regularization jurisprudence in the context of a well-framed attack on 
unstructured state sentencing systems”). My point is crafted similarly—after Exxon, it should 
be hard for the Court to avoid finding that state common law punitive damage jury 
instructions violate procedural due process given its holding that the same instructions are 
incapable of producing predictable punitive awards. 
 202. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 513. 
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defendant’s conduct also resulted in substantial compensatory 
damages,203 meaning a high punitive award was not necessary to 
incentivize the suit. Based on these facts, the defendant was on 
notice that a punitive damage award imposed would be roughly 
equal to the compensatory damage award.204 Put another way, the 
defendant lacked notice that the award would exceed the substantial 
compensatory damage award. 
It is important to note that the Court did not suggest looking at 
specific prior awards in making the factually based ratio 
determination,205 although some have inaccurately interpreted Exxon 
this way.206 For example, the Eighth Circuit reduced a Missouri 
punitive damage award based on a prior award from a Wisconsin case 
that the defendant had cited in its appellate brief.207 The “citation of 
this case implies that [the defendant] would have had notice that its 
conduct could lead to” punitive damages in the same amount as in 
the Wisconsin case.208  
But the Court did not look to prior awards in Exxon and prior 
awards should not control fair notice for numerous reasons. First, 
this type of analysis puts the cart before the horse—it forces 
consistency and inappropriately assumes that the prior awards are 
 
 203. Id. at 480–81.  
 204. See id. at 512–13.  
 205. Realistically, a comparison to specific prior awards was likely impossible because the 
case involved the greatest environmental disaster ever (at the time, unfortunately, until the BP 
Oil Spill). See Anne C. Mulkerin, BP’s Oil Spill Bill Could Dwarf Exxon’s Valdez Tab, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/03/03greenwire-bps-oil-
spill-bill-could-dwarf-exxons-ivaldezi-91298.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that many 
analysts are using “Exxon Valdez as the barometer for what BP is likely to pay”). 
 206. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages After Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker: The 
Quest for Predictability and the Role of Juries, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 182, 192–93 (2009) 
(“[S]ince Exxon, courts have carefully surveyed prior opinions reviewing punitive damages 
verdicts to ensure their ratios and punitive damage awards are in line with those prior cases.”).   
 207. See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 877 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 208. Id. The Eighth Circuit’s finding is also interesting because it raises issues of whether 
predictability is subjective or objective. See id. Justice Souter’s definition of predictability seems 
specific to the tortfeasor—that he must have some ability to understand the stakes of his 
decision. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 513 n.27. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit mentions that the 
specific defendant had notice. See JCB, 539 F.3d at 877. At the same time, the Eighth Circuit’s 
finding is not true subjective predictability because the citation was years after the tortious 
conduct. Still, it seems fair to impute notice of the Wisconsin case to the defendant given the 
citation. But without the citation, would it be fair? Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 
N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997), is a staple in first-year law school property and/or tort classes, but 
non-law students are likely not aware of it and reasonably so.  
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sound.209 It is likely that most prior comparison awards were awarded 
without procedures in place to ensure their predictability.210 Second, 
forcing consistency among punitive awards “can overshadow the 
jury’s determination of the facts of the case,”211 which is the reason 
the Court has discouraged comparisons historically.212 The Court’s 
opinions still evidence a private law conception of punitive damage 
awards, meaning the punitive award should reflect the facts of the 
particular case.213 Last, forcing consistency among awards would 
eliminate the jury’s current role in assessing punitive damages based 
on the specific facts of the case.214 The Court did not want this. In 
defining a predictable penalty, the Court specifically deferred to 
juries and noted that a median ratio illustrates “jurors’ sense of 
reasonable penalties” when conduct is merely reckless and 
 
 209. Cf. Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort 
Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 344 (2006) (“Perhaps the reviewing court could evaluate 
the [pain and suffering] award in terms of its comparability with prior awards for similar 
injuries. But this approach inappropriately assumes that prior awards are constitutionally 
sound.”).  
 210. Mandating consistency among awards would also create additional practical 
problems. For instance, what kind of prior awards can be used in the comparison? Is it limited 
to awards from the same jurisdiction? Must the prior award have been reviewed by an appellate 
court? Must that appellate court be the Supreme Court? Must the award have been affirmed in 
a reported case? Must that review have involved constitutional challenges? Does the court 
conducting the comparison first need to evaluate whether the prior award was proper? 
Although a prior comparison award is a final judgment, some sort of review of the prior award 
seems necessary. If there is any basis upon which the prior award was improper, then 
consistency is not desired. Any challenges to the prior award would be collateral attacks by a 
third party, as time for direct appeal would likely have passed. If the court grants the collateral 
attack and declines to use the prior award for the comparison, what happens to the continued 
viability of that prior award as between the original parties?    
 211. Klass, supra note 206, at 196. 
 212. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457–58 (1993) 
(“[A] jury imposing a punitive damages award must make a qualitative assessment based on a 
host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case before it. Because no two cases are 
truly identical, meaningful comparisons of such awards are difficult to make.”). 
 213. See generally Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort Law’s Influence in 
Defining the Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
595, 625–35 (2011).   
 214. See Klass, supra note 206, at 201 (“[T]he Court has identified a problem—
unpredictability—that cannot be easily addressed without fundamentally altering the role of 
juries in meting out civil justice.”). The only practical way for juries to reach consistent awards 
is for them to base awards on prior awards, but evidence of prior awards is likely inadmissible. 
See id. at 191–92 (“Such information about completely different cases is likely inadmissible 
under the rules of evidence and thus juries and lower courts are unable to remedy the problem 
the Supreme Court has now identified.”).  
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compensatory damages are substantial.215 Exxon does not signal a 
shift to forcing consistency among awards or otherwise ending the 
jury’s role in assessing punitive damages. 
Instead, Exxon predictability is defined by the facts. If the 
potential tortious conduct is reckless but would cause a substantial 
amount of damage, the defendant is on notice of a punitive damage 
award roughly equal to the compensatory damage award. 
Presumably, this also means that if the potential conduct is malicious 
and likely to cause a substantial amount of damage, the defendant is 
on notice that the punitive damage will likely exceed the 
compensatory damage award—but maybe not by much given the 
Court’s commentary that a higher ratio is usually only proper if the 
compensatory damages are minimal.216 Accordingly, if the planned 
conduct is malicious but likely to cause only insubstantial damage, 
the defendant is on notice that the punitive damage award will likely 
greatly exceed the compensatory award.217  
V. THE IRONY OF EXXON: THE UNPREDICTABLE BASELINE  
Although the Court’s desire to improve the predictability of 
punitive damages is clear in Exxon, the Court’s proposed pegging 
solution is fundamentally flawed. It cannot achieve predictable 
 
 215. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).  
 216. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). 
 217. The similarities between the constitutional guideposts and Exxon predictability have 
prompted some lower courts to think that predictability is a substantive limitation, citing 
Exxon next to BMW and State Farm as if the cases state the same thing. See, e.g., John Hancock 
Life Ins. Co. v. Perchikov, No. 04 CV 98 (NG) (MDG), 2010 WL 185007, at *4–5 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010); Perez-Farias v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. CV-05-3061-RHW, 
2009 WL 1011180, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2009); Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1274 (Idaho 2010). The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in 
Wyeth LLC v. Scofield, in which the petitioners argued that the Court’s holding in Exxon 
indicates that “when a court awards a substantial amount in compensatory damages, it would 
violate due process to award an even greater amount in punitive damages.” Petition for  Writ 
of Certiorari at 23, Wyeth LLC v. Scofield, 131 S.Ct. 3028 (2011) (No. 10-1177), 2011 WL 
1155235. Despite the similarities between the guideposts and Exxon, predictability is a 
procedural limitation. Practically though, solving unpredictability may also eliminate 
substantive due process concerns. Suppose that after Exxon the defendant could and still 
wanted to challenge the punitive damage award on substantive due process grounds. The level 
of reprehensibility was low, only a 1:1 ratio existed between the substantial compensatory 
damages and the punitive award, and the award was at least somewhat consistent with the 
criminal sanctions for comparable conduct. Using the Court’s definition of predictability, an 
award would likely either be unpredictable and substantively excessive, or predictable and not 
substantively excessive. The Court’s definition of predictability, however, cannot achieve 
predictable punitive damage awards. See discussion infra Part V.  
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awards because it uses an unpredictable baseline—the compensatory 
award.218 Tort law mandates the unpredictability of compensatory 
damages through personalization and specific doctrines. Further, a 
compensatory damage baseline is not logical given the limited 
connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the availability of 
punitive damages.  
A. The Unpredictable Nature of Compensatory Damages  
Compensatory damages are unpredictable because their amount 
depends on the specific plaintiff, her circumstances, and her injury—
all details that a defendant likely does not know before committing a 
tort. And even if a defendant were well-versed in the plaintiff’s 
circumstances, tort law sometimes specifically mandates 
compensation for consequences that no reasonable person could 
have foreseen, much less the defendant. At most, a compensatory 
damage baseline enables post-trial predictability, which is not really 
predictability at all.  
1. Mandatory personalization to the specific plaintiff 
The aim of compensatory damages is to put the injured plaintiff 
“in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to 
the tort.”219 Necessarily, the amount of compensatory damages 
depends on the specific circumstances of the injured plaintiff. If the 
specific plaintiff has $60,000 in past medical expenses and more 
likely than not will need another surgery costing $50,000, her 
compensatory damages will total $110,000—because that is what 
she suffered. If the specific plaintiff used to make $1 million in salary 
before the injury and now cannot work, the calculation of her future 
lost wages will look to that prior $1 million salary. The amount of all 
 
 218. In a prior Article, I argued that the Court’s use of compensatory damages as a 
baseline is proper because of tort law’s influence on the Court’s substantive constitutional 
analysis of punitive damage awards. See Lens, supra note 213, at 633–35. If the aim is 
predictability, however, compensatory damages are an improper baseline.   
 219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1977); see also Overstreet v. 
Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“The purpose of tort damages in 
Anglo–American law is to compensate the wronged party for damage or injury caused by the 
defendant’s conduct. The goal of awarding damages is to repair the wronged party’s injury, or 
at least, to make the wronged party whole as nearly as may be done by an award of 
money.”(internal citations omitted)); DeNike v. Mowery, 418 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Wash. 1966) 
(explaining that the fundamental purpose of tort law is to make the plaintiff as nearly whole as 
possible through pecuniary compensation).  
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compensatory damages, whether they are medical expenses, lost 
wages, pain and suffering, or emotional distress, is based on the 
plaintiff’s specific circumstances.  
The defendant’s conduct therefore has minimal relevance to the 
amount of compensatory damages. True, battery based on shooting 
someone likely causes greater compensatory damages than battery 
based on throwing a pencil at someone (although even this is not 
guaranteed). But outside the comparison of such extremes, the 
tortious conduct itself has little bearing, and two identical tortious 
conducts can result in vastly different amounts of compensatory 
damages. One plaintiff shot in the leg may have relatively small 
medical expenses because she recovered from surgery well, and may 
lack lost future wages because her job involves sitting at a desk, 
which she is still fully able to do. Another plaintiff shot in the leg, 
however, may have large medical expenses due to unsuccessful 
surgeries, and may have dramatic lost future wages because the 
plaintiff was a professional athlete and can no longer play. The first 
shooting defendant will pay little in compensatory damages, and the 
second will pay a large amount. The similarity of the tortious 
conducts is irrelevant—the compensatory damages must differ to  
ensure each plaintiff is returned to the same place in which he would 
have been if no tort had occurred.  
The amount of compensatory damages awarded depends on 
details about the specific plaintiff—details that the defendant likely 
will not know before committing the tortious conduct.220 One of 
those unknown details is a plaintiff’s pre-existing conditions. The 
eggshell plaintiff rule famously mandates compensation for damages 
worsened due to a plaintiff’s pre-existing condition,221 even though 
the extent of the injury is unforeseeable.222 As an example, if a 
 
 220. See Shanin Specter & Charles L. Becker, The Exxon Decision: Another Bad Call on 
Punitive Damages, 238 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 7 (Nov. 18, 2008) (“[T]he court failed to 
recognize that one part of the equation—compensatory damages—are inherently 
unpredictable, as they depend on the harm suffered by the plaintiff.”). 
 221. 2 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 11.1 (3d ed. 2011) 
(“An injured person is entitled to recover full compensation for all damages that proximately 
result from a defendant’s tortious act, even if some or all of the injuries might not have 
occurred but for the plaintiff’s preexisting physical condition, disease, or susceptibility to 
injury.”).  
 222. See, e.g., id. (“The foreseeability to the defendant that the plaintiff might be injured 
by his or her conduct does not affect liability, as the defendant must take the victim as the 
defendant finds him or her.”); see also Brandner v. Hudson, 171 P.3d 83, 88 (Alaska 2007) 
(explaining that the “eggshell plaintiff” rule mandates that the defendant pays compensatory 
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plaintiff has a heart condition making her more susceptible to stress, 
a simple assault based on scaring the plaintiff may end up causing a  
heart attack. The defendant will pay damages based on causing that 
heart attack even though it was unforeseeable.  
Another detail that a defendant likely will not know about a 
plaintiff is his financial condition, to which the eggshell plaintiff rule 
also applies. Thus, if the defendant’s conduct deprives a plaintiff of 
her $2 million per year earning capacity, the defendant is liable for 
that loss—even if the defendant is unaware of the plaintiff’s earning 
potential and thus could not have foreseen the extent of the 
compensatory damages.223  
Even if a defendant is well-versed in his plaintiff’s medical and 
economic conditions, the defendant has little ability to know the 
likely amount of compensation for intangible, noneconomic harms 
like pain and suffering. Empirical research has shown that, when 
organized based on severity of physical injury, the accompanying 
pain and suffering injuries properly reflect that severity; so the pain 
and suffering award for loss of an eye is greater than the award for 
temporary burns.224 However, within the same category of severity of 
injury, the study found great variability.225 “Much of this variation 
may legitimately reflect claimants’ precise individual circumstances, 
as the tort system intends.”226 Each plaintiff is different; “[t]wo 
persons apparently suffering the same pain from the same kind of 
 
damages based on the plaintiff’s entire injury “caused or aggravated” by the defendant’s 
conduct even though the extent of injury “may have been unusual or unpredictable”); Schafer 
v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 902 (Colo. 1992) (“The thin skull [a.k.a. eggshell plaintiff] 
doctrine declares that foreseeability of plaintiff’s injuries is not an issue in determining the 
extent of injury suffered . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 223. See Schafer, 831 P.2d at 902 (“[The] shabby millionaire rule declares that 
foreseeability is not an issue in determining the extent of damages that the injuries cause.”). 
 224. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and 
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 921, 924 (1989).  
 225. See id. at 923 (“Within an individual severity level, the highest valuation can be 
scores of times larger than the lowest.”). “Although the median, and even mean, awards in a 
given category may be considered relatively reasonable, the seemingly uncontrolled variability 
of awards is cause for concern . . . .” Id. at 924. This analysis is similar to the Court’s in Exxon, 
finding that the median punitive award in the cases studied was reasonable, but the outliers 
were troubling. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499–500 (2008). Many have 
questioned whether Exxon also applies to pain and suffering damages. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra 
note 37, at 45 (“Surely, the same unpredictability that taints the jury’s punitive damages 
decision-making process would surface in the jury’s determination of noneconomic 
compensatory damages . . . .”).   
 226. Bovjberg et al., supra note 224, at 923. 
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injury might in fact be suffering respectively pains differing much in 
acuteness, depending on the nervous sensibility of the sufferer.”227 
Differences among plaintiffs, however, do not entirely explain the 
variability in the amounts of pain and suffering compensatory 
damages.228 Another contributing factor is that the damages “have 
no economic referent and no widely agreed-on means of 
determination.”229 Awarding noneconomic pain and suffering 
damages has “rendered the degree of a potential defendant’s 
exposure almost completely unknowable ex ante.”230  
2. Mandatory compensation of the unforeseeable in intentional torts 
Regardless of how much research a defendant does on his victim 
pre-tort, the research could not encompass all aspects of 
compensatory damages. Tort law mandates compensation for the 
unpredictable consequences of a defendant’s intentional tortious 
conduct, the type of tortious conduct most likely to trigger the 
availability of punitive damages.231 As between an injured plaintiff 
 
 227. Rael v. F & S Co., 612 P.2d 1318, 1325 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (Sutin, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Herb. v. Hollowell, 154 A. 582, 584 
(1931)); see also Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“The only person whose pain and suffering is relevant in calculating a general damage award is 
the plaintiff.”).  
 228. See Bovjberg et al., supra note 224, at 923. 
 229. Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if 
Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 862–63 (1999).  
 230. Id. at 863. In addition to pain and suffering damages, another type of damage in 
tort that arguably encompasses the unforeseeable is consequential damages, meaning those 
damages that are a consequence of the defendant’s tortious conduct, but not a direct result 
thereof. Tort law uses a less strict, foreseeability-based restriction in defining consequential 
damages:  
Under either a tort or a contract standard, the foreseeability of the consequences is a 
factor. However, the test derived from Hadley imposes a more restrictive 
foreseeability limitation. To be recoverable under the Hadley test, consequential 
damages must be so likely that “it can fairly be said” both parties contemplated 
these damages as the probable result of the wrong at the time the tort occurred. 
Under the tort standard, damages need only be reasonably foreseeable. 
Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 870 (Colo. 2002). 
 231. See Baker v. Shymkiv, 451 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ohio 1983) (“Intentional trespassers 
are within that class of less-favored wrongdoers.”). In negligence cases, where punitive 
damages are generally not available because of the defendant’s lessened culpability, duty and 
proximate cause elements work to limit the defendant’s liability to only those consequences 
that a reasonable person would have foreseen. See Seidel v. Greenberg, 260 A.2d 863, 871 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) (“[W]here intentional acts are involved . . . it is clear that the 
rules of causation are more liberally applied to hold a defendant responsible for the 
consequences of his acts.”). 
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and a culpable defendant, the culpable defendant should bear the 
burden of compensating the unforeseeable.232  
As an example, if a plaintiff suffers a heart attack and dies as a 
result of the defendant’s trespass on the plaintiff’s property, the 
defendant is liable in compensatory damages for the plaintiff’s death 
despite the unforeseeability of the heart attack.233 As another 
example, the doctrine of transferred intent specifically mandates that 
a defendant can be liable for battery (e.g., for shooting someone) 
and must pay compensatory damages based on the battery, even if 
the defendant intended only to scare the person.234 Similarly, the 
defendant would also be liable for battery to a second person if he 
injured the second person even though he intended only to commit 
an assault against another person.235 Transferred intent mandates that 
a defendant will pay compensatory damages to a plaintiff, about 
which she did not know, for a tort she did not mean to commit. No 
amount of research could make these damages knowable to the 
defendant.  
3. At most, a compensatory damage baseline enables post-verdict 
“predictability” 
Because of personalization and mandatory compensation of the 
unforeseeable, the first moment at which the defendant can know 
the compensatory damage award is when the jury verdict is 
announced. At that point, the defendant could evaluate the amount 
of damages with the reprehensibility of his conduct, determine the 
likely ratio, and then calculate the likely amount of punitive damages. 
Hopefully the defendant could do this quickly, given that the 
punitive award would likely be announced shortly after. Sarcasm 
aside, this is not the pre-tortious predictability that would enable 
defendants to order their behavior. 
A more limited predictability of the likely ratio between the 
punitive and compensatory damages, as opposed to a predictable 
 
 232. See Baker, 451 N.E.2d at 813 (“[T]he courts are confronted with an innocent 
victim and an intentional wrongdoer, and hence it is not surprising that the interest of the 
victim in obtaining full compensation is placed above the interest of the wrongdoer in 
protecting himself against potentially speculative damage awards.” (quoting Columbus Fin., 
Inc. v. Howard, 327 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ohio 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 233. See id. at 813–14.  
 234. See Seidel, 260 A.2d at 872. 
 235. See id. 
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award, is also possible only post-trial.236 This is because the 
“predictable” ratio depends on the amount of compensatory 
damages. In Exxon, the court used the substantial amount of 
compensatory damages to determine that no more than a 1:1 ratio 
was appropriate.237 If the next case involves reckless conduct and a 
small amount of compensatory damages, a 1:1 ratio is likely not 
proper because of that smaller compensatory award, which lacks as 
much inherent punitive effect. Thus, even if the Exxon Court merely 
envisioned that the ratio—not the amount—would be predictable, 
even the ratio is not predictable until after the jury announces the 
compensatory award.  
B. The Illogic of Compensatory Damages as the Baseline  
Even if compensatory damages were predictable, they still would 
not be a logical baseline to which to peg the punitive award. First, 
the rationales for awarding compensatory damages have no 
connection to the reasons why punitive damages are available and 
awarded. Second, compensatory damages do not objectively reflect 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.  
The purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter. They 
are available only when punishment and deterrence are needed—if 
the defendant acts maliciously or with some heightened culpability. 
Although the existence of compensatory damages is what enables 
tort law to punish,238 the compensatory damage award—both 
historically and today—has little connection to the punitive damage 
award,239 despite the Court’s emphasis on a mathematical 
 
 236. Given the unpredictable nature of compensatory damages, maybe what the Court 
meant in Exxon is that a defendant should be able to look ahead and know the likely ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages; maybe predictability only refers to the likely 
ratio. This does not, however, seem to be specific enough to meet Justice Souter’s description 
of predictability, which envisions that a potential tortfeasor be able to look ahead “with some 
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.” Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008). Knowing that the likely ratio will be 2:1 
still could mean that the amount of punitive damages would be $1 billion or $10,000 
depending on the compensatory award, precluding a true understanding of the “stakes.”  
 237. Id. at 514–15 (applying a 1:1 ratio due to the defendant’s low degree of 
reprehensibility and affirming that the ratio “is not too low” because of the substantial 
compensatory damage award). 
 238. See Lens, supra note 213, at 601–04. 
 239. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 491 (“[P]unitive damages were a common law innovation 
untethered to strict numerical multipliers . . . .”). 
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relationship.240 This lack of connection is apparent given that 
compensatory damages alone cannot trigger punitive damages; 
otherwise they would be available for mere negligence.241 It is 
possible that a plaintiff’s compensatory damages may be higher if the 
defendant acts maliciously, but not necessarily.242 BMW is an 
example of minimal compensatory damages despite intentional and 
knowing fraudulent tortious conduct.243  
Similarly, objectively, “killing another is viewed as more serious 
than severely injuring a person.”244 Criminal law reflects this: 
 
[P]unishment schemes reflect this hierarchy of wrongfulness by 
punishing a homicide much more severely than an assault with 
intent to commit murder, even though the conduct and culpability 
that produced the death or injury are the same. As a result, two 
defendants who commit the same act with the same culpability of 
intent to kill will receive different punishment depending on 
whether their victims die or live.245  
Amounts of compensatory damages, on the other hand, do not 
reflect this objective assessment. A young, severely injured plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages will likely exceed the compensatory damages 
for a similarly injured older person. The young plaintiff has a longer 
life expectancy, meaning future decades of compensable lost wages, 
medical expenses, and pain and suffering; the older plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages will be smaller simply because of the shorter 
life expectancy. Similarly, the compensatory damages based on the 
wrongful death of five people may actually be less than the 
compensatory damages for the death of one person if the five 
deceased people were older and retired and the one deceased person 
was young and gainfully employed.  
 
 240. Sharkey, supra note 37, at 28 (“The Court itself has fueled this heightened attention 
to ratios.”). 
 241. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 
1029 (2007) (“[T]he fact that a common-law penalty is based on a ratio cannot be an 
argument for its fairness.”). 
 242. See Romero, supra note 199, at 137 (“Because the amount of compensatory 
damages measures the harm done, the ratio [of punitive to compensatory damages] guidepost 
may produce a punitive damages award that does not reflect the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct.”). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 90–91. 
 244. Romero, supra note 199, at 135.  
 245. Id. 
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If “the harm caused by wrongful conduct should figure in 
measuring reprehensibility,”246 the way to do so is not to evaluate 
that harm based on the compensatory damages. As a reform to 
punitive damages, Professor Romero advocates legislatively set ratios 
based on the type of case. For instance, in personal injury/death 
cases, the legislature might cap punitive damages at thirty times the 
compensatory damages or $20 million, whichever is greater.247 
Professor Romero believes that such limits “would reflect society’s 
judgments about the right proportion of punishment to 
misconduct.”248 But this assumes that compensatory damage awards 
reflect society’s objective judgment about the extent of harm, which 
is not true.249 The only thing a compensatory damage award reflects 
is the particular plaintiff and his injury. Thus, compensatory damages  
as a baseline will not achieve punitive awards “commensurate with 
the wrongful conduct.”250  
VI. RESTITUTION AS A MODEL TO CRAFT A PREDICTABLE, CIVIL 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD 
If the goal is to create predictable punitive damage awards, as 
procedural due process requires, the plaintiff’s compensatory damage 
award cannot be involved. Suggested alternative reforms have 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 157. Professor Fisher also suggests legislatively-set ratios. See Fisher, supra 
note 153, at 41–42. 
 248. Romero, supra note 199, at 157. 
 249. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 290 (2009) (“If punitive damages are based on 
compensatory damages, then when a defendant’s misconduct kills or injures a poor person—
i.e., someone whose death or injury triggers smaller compensatory damages under 
conventional valuation models—the punitive award will be lower than an award for the same 
misconduct committed against a wealthy person.”).  
 250. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
see also Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1426 
(2009) (“Using a multiplier approach would, in many cases involving risk of injury, just 
exacerbate much of the extant arbitrariness in the context of compensatory damages.”). For 
the arbitrariness of compensatory damages, Professor Markel cites to Geistfeld, supra note 209, 
at 342 (noting that plaintiffs “with similar pain-and-suffering injuries often are awarded 
significantly different amounts of damages”). Professor Geistfeld’s conclusion, which cites to 
the Bovberg study, supra note 224, says too much. The study concluded that plaintiffs with 
similarly severe physical injuries—not similar amounts of pain and suffering—are often awarded 
significantly different pain and suffering damage awards. See Bovbjerg, supra note 224, at 924. 
Some of this disparity properly reflects the plaintiffs’ individual circumstances. See supra notes 
226–227 and accompanying text.  
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included statutorily defined monetary fines and pegging punitive 
damages to the defendant’s net worth, but these non-civil-looking 
reform suggestions are problematic. A less obvious alternative, 
proposed by this Article, is to borrow from restitution. Restitution is 
a forgotten civil remedy based on the defendant’s gain. On top of a 
compensatory damage award based on the plaintiff’s injury, the 
defendant could be subject to punitive damages measured by the 
defendant’s gain.251 Basing punitive damages on the defendant’s gain 
will produce the predictability that Exxon seeks and procedural due 
process requires. 
A. Non-Civil-Looking Reforms to Craft a Predictable Punitive Award 
Exxon signals a need to revisit procedures used to impose 
punitive damages, especially because reform to achieve predictability 
is likely constitutionally required. Two possible methods that may 
achieve predictability include legislatively defined awards or pegging 
the award to the defendant’s wealth.  
1. Legislatively defined awards 
Professor Jeffrey Fisher reads Exxon as demonstrating that the 
Court “clearly has come down on the side of preferring legislation” 
to set punitive damage awards.252 Although defined awards using 
ratios to compensatory damages cannot achieve predictability, 
defined monetary ranges based on the tortious conduct could. 
Before the tort, the defendant could look to the defined ranges and  
 
 
 251. The use of the word “gain” in this Article refers only to that common sense 
evaluation of what the defendant expected to gain through the tortious conduct. It is not so 
specific as to mean net income or gain, meaning income minus expenses.   
  Professor Gail Heriot suggested that, instead of punitive damages, restitution should 
be used to reach the “difficult-to-deter defendants,” meaning those defendants whose gains 
from the tortious conduct exceeded the plaintiff’s losses. See Gail Heriot, Civilizing Punitive 
Damages: Lessons from Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 882 (2003). She argued that 
restitution was preferable because it has the theoretical “virtue of providing a level of 
deterrence . . . sufficient to make the rational defendant regret his actions,” and because it 
better addressed those cases where deterrence was necessary—which is not every case in which 
the defendant acted reprehensibly. Id. at 882. Professor Heriot did not address the punishment 
purposes of punitive damages, or how restitution could serve those purposes. This Article 
proposes that punitive damages remain available only if the defendant’s conduct is 
reprehensible, and that the measure of those damages should be the defendant’s gains—
producing a predictable, civil punitive damage.    
 252. See Fisher, supra note 153, at 29. 
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have a good idea of the amount of punitive damages he could face if 
sued.  
The Court mentioned this possibility in Exxon, but rejected it 
because of practical limitations. Just as there is no standard tort 
injury,253 there is no standard tortious conduct. Should the award for 
battery always be more severe than the award for torts causing 
economic harm?254 Even if the battery caused only minor physical 
damage and the fraudulent misrepresentation caused millions of 
dollars in compensatory damages?  
Even within the same tort, each case has different facts. The 
legislation would necessarily be generalized, perhaps defining an 
award for all fraudulent misrepresentations. But a fraudulent 
misrepresentation can involve the value of a coffee cup just as easily 
as it can involve the value of complicated (and expensive) 
investments. Very few would think that the punishments should be 
the same in both cases, but the facts of individual cases are lost when 
categorically defined awards are used.  
Even if the legislature could devise set punitive damages based 
on the type of tortious conduct, these damages would bear little 
resemblance to civil remedies. Compensatory damages, another civil 
remedy, are tied to the plaintiff and her injury. Dissimilarly, punitive 
damages, if based on a legislatively defined amount, would lack any 
factual connection to the case or the specific tortious conduct that 
triggered their availability. Instead, the amount of the award would 
be based on a (perhaps arbitrary) determination by the legislature 
that punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation should be 
between $50,000 and $100,000. Even Exxon reflects a desire to 
avoid this disconnect.255 It at least maintains a connection between 
 
 253. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 506 (2008).  
 254. Professor Fisher addressed this problem as follows:  
But it is easy to forget that even when criminal statutes do nothing more than 
establish maximum sentences, they peg those sentences to fairly particular kinds of 
conduct (robbery, kidnapping, etc.). Tort systems, by contrast, cover a wide range 
of disparate conduct—from assault to trespassing to defamation to interference with 
business expectancies.  
See Fisher, supra note 153, at 41. Another factor making legislative involvement difficult is that 
courts, as the controllers of common law, can recognize new torts. For instance, products 
liability claims originated through judicial creations. If a court were to recognize a new tort 
claim, no law would exist to govern punitive damage liability for that new tort claim until the 
legislature acted.    
 255. See Lens, supra note 213, at 633–35 (explaining how the Court returned to the 
specific facts of the case, mainly the plaintiff’s injury, in describing how best to make punitive 
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the punitive award and the facts of the case, although it does so 
through the unfortunate use of the compensatory award as a 
baseline. 
2. Pegging to the defendant’s wealth 
Professor Dan Markel suggests that “retributive damages” be 
some multiple of the defendant’s net worth.256 More specifically, 
Professor Markel proposes that the legislature or sentencing 
commission devise a scale of approximately twenty reprehensibility 
levels and their accompanying multiples.257 The individual jury would 
choose the level that applies to the defendant.258 The jury would 
then apply that multiple to the individual defendant’s wealth or 
corporate defendant’s value to determine the punitive award. For 
example, a “finding of two on the scale could lead to a retributive 
damages award of 1 percent of the defendant’s net wealth, and a 
finding of twenty could lead to a penalty of 10 percent of the 
defendant’s net wealth.”259  
Many courts already allow the jury to consider the defendant’s 
wealth in setting the amount of punitive award. This may fulfill the 
punishment aspect of punitive damages—ensuring that “wealthier 
tortfeasors should be punished, like all people, in a manner that 
adequately communicates to them that their risk-imposing, wrongful 
behavior is not subject to a price but rather a sanction.”260 
 
damages predictable). 
 256. Professor Markel proposes a pluralistic system of “punitive” damages allowing three 
types: deterrence damages based on cost-internalization, retributive damages, and victim 
vindication aggravated damages. See Markel, supra note 250, at 1403–04. A pluralistic 
approach is appropriate because “[d]ifferent cases present different problems; not every case 
requires pursuit of any of these purposes.” Id. The discussion of Markel’s reprehensibility scale 
applies only to retributive damages, which Markel introduced to achieve the “public’s interest 
in retributive justice.” See Markel, supra note 249, at 246. In a previous article, I argued that 
tort law’s injury requirement has influenced the Supreme Court’s limitations on punitive 
damages and that those limitations reflect a private law conception of punitive damages.  See 
Lens, supra note 213 at 638–40.  Necessarily, a punitive damage award cannot constitutionally 
reflect the public’s interests. Id.   
 257. Markel, supra note 249, at 287. 
 258. Id. at 288. 
 259. Id. at 289. 
 260. Dan Markel, Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
283, 291 (2010); see also Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant’s Wealth as 
Factor in Determining Propriety of Award, 87 A.L.R. 4TH 141 (1991) (explaining that 
evidence of defendant’s finances will ensure that the damage award does not “exceed[] the 
necessary level of punishment”).   
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Considering the defendant’s wealth can also ensure adequate 
deterrence—making the award high enough to remove any incentive 
to commit the tortious conduct.261 
Professor Markel’s solution seems to achieve predictability.262 
Assuming that wealth or corporate value was well-defined, this 
baseline is very much knowable to the defendant when deciding 
whether to commit the tortious conduct.263 And if the legislature-
defined reprehensibility levels included examples as Professor Markel 
envisions,264 the defendant should be able to evaluate where his 
potential tortious conduct falls. 
Nevertheless, Professor Markel’s solution suffers from the same 
logic-based problems as the Court’s Exxon suggestion. A defendant’s 
wealth is an arbitrary baseline—like compensatory damages, a 
defendant’s wealth has no connection to why punitive damages are 
available or imposed. If a defendant commits battery, she deserves 
punishment because she committed battery; her wealth does not 
make her any more or less deserving of punishment.265 Even the  
 
  Professor Markel assumes that higher punitive damage awards are necessary for 
wealthier people to fully communicate societal disapproval of their action; a $10,000 punitive 
award may sufficiently express disapproval to a poor person, but not to a wealthy person. But 
criminal sentences do not need to vary based on the defendant’s wealth. A long-term 
imprisonment sentence communicates to all people, wealthy or poor, the objective view of the 
severity of the conduct. Aside from general moral concerns, this is why people view murder as 
worse than robbery. There similarly should be no need to increase a punitive damage award to 
ensure an adequate communication of disapproval. Wealthy and poor people do not receive 
different messages regarding the severity of the conduct based on the amount of the punitive 
award. But they may interpret the level of deterrence differently. If not high enough, a punitive 
award may not deter a wealthy person.  
  Even if wealth should be relevant to ensure an adequate communication of 
disapproval, the idea that a wealthy defendant will “feel” a punishment more if it is based on 
wealth is debatable. Chances are that a rich defendant can more easily part with one percent of 
his net worth than a poor defendant, who may be crippled by a one percent punishment.   
 261. Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant’s Wealth as Factor in 
Determining Propriety of Award, 87 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1991) (explaining that evidence of 
defendant’s finances will ensure that the award is high enough to preclude the defendant from 
“absorb[ing] . . . the award with little or no discomfort”). 
 262. This statement is specific to Markel’s measure of retributive damages. 
 263. Markel, supra note 249, at 287 (concluding that his proposed “scaling approach 
would enhance . . . fair notice”); see also Markel, supra note 250, at 1402–03 (“The scheme 
described above furnishes potential defendants with little basis for complaining that the 
amount or award of retributive damages is a surprise, since the standards that would be applied 
to them are no different than the guidelines that have now become familiar in many 
jurisdictions when assessing criminal liability and sentencing.”). 
 264. Markel, supra note 250, at 1401. 
 265. See Romero, supra note 199, at 131 (“[W]ealth has nothing to do with the 
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current use of wealth in jury instructions is for setting the amount—
not in determining whether punishment is appropriate.  
Because of its lack of connection to why punitive damages are 
available and imposed, using the defendant’s wealth as a baseline is 
about as arbitrary as a legislature defining a $100,000 punitive award 
for fraud. This is forced predictability, as opposed to an award 
predictably reflecting the defendant’s tortious conduct that made 
punitive damages available in the first place. 
B. A Refresher on Restitution 
Turning back to civil remedies to find a possible model for 
reform, tort law already recognizes a remedy that reflects the 
defendant’s tortious conduct—restitution, a “relatively neglected and 
underdeveloped” civil remedy.266 Simply put, restitution is based on 
the defendant’s gain.267 Could punitive damages be similarly based 
on the defendant’s gain? But restitution is not punitive—or is it? 
Much overlap exists between restitution and punitive damages, 
especially in how courts alter the measurement of the defendant’s 
gain based on the defendant’s culpability.  
 
wrongfulness of conduct . . . .”); Michael I. Krauss, “Retributive Damages” and the Death of 
Private Ordering, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 167, 177 (2010) (“If a person is to be punished, it 
should be for what she had done, not for who she is, even if she is a large corporation.”); see 
also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003) (“The wealth of a 
defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.”). 
 266. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 
1277 (1989); see also Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution 
with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 977 
(2011) (explaining that restitution is “subject to professional misunderstanding on every 
level”). Professor Laycock explains the three meanings of restitution: (1) as substantive law 
providing a claim for unjust enrichment, (2) as a remedy based on the defendant’s gain, or 
involving returning specific property to the plaintiff, and (3) as restoring to plaintiff her losses. 
See Laycock, supra, at 1279–83. This third concept of restitution is commonly used in criminal 
statutes, requiring “criminals to make restitution to their victims.” Id. at 1282–83. This 
restitution label is unfortunate because “restitution of what the plaintiff lost is simply 
compensatory damages.” Id. All references to restitution in this Article are to the civil remedy 
based on the defendant’s gain. 
 267. See Laycock, supra note 266, at 1286 (“For substantive claims not dependent on the 
[substantive] law of restitution—such as those based in ordinary torts and breaches of 
contract—plaintiff generally has an election. Plaintiff can always claim his own damages; 
alternatively, he can usually claim defendant’s gain.”). A form of restitution also exists in 
criminal law. See id. at 1282–83.     
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1. Restitution is not compensatory 
The purposes of restitution differ from the purposes of 
compensatory damages. Damages seek to compensate the plaintiff 
for his losses and are thus measured by those losses.268 Restitution 
seeks to deprive the defendant of “those gains that do not belong to 
him in good conscience,”269 and is thus measured by those gains. 
The extent of the defendant’s gains can easily exceed the plaintiff’s 
losses, providing the plaintiff money in excess of her losses—thus 
providing something more than the amount necessary to compensate 
her. This extra amount is sometimes called a windfall.270 Restitution 
does not fit into the compensatory category of remedies because of 
this windfall.  
2. Punitive purposes?  
Even though it is not compensatory, restitution is also not 
commonly thought of as a punitive remedy—“[t]he mere recovery of 
defendant’s profit in a wrongful transaction is not by itself 
punitive . . . .”271 But there is overlap. “Both deter. A court measures 
both restitution and punitive damages to deflect potential defendants 
from profitable misconduct by taking a defendant’s benefit or 
profit.”272 Supposedly, the difference is that punitive damages also 
punish: “The Court determines the difference between restitution 
and punitive damages by considering how much deterrence to mete 
out and whether, in addition, the defendant ought to be 
punished.”273 But “skilled lawyers can sometimes use claims for 
 
 268. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION, HORNBOOK 
SERIES § 4.1(1), at 369 (2d ed. 1993). 
 269. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION, 
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, § 4.5(5), at 655 (2d ed. 1993). 
 270. See Laycock, supra note 266, at 1281 (awarding defendant’s profits to the plaintiff 
does not “restor[e] anything that plaintiff once had or ever would have had”). The only other 
remedy available in tort capable of providing the defendant a windfall is punitive damages.   
 271. DOBBS, supra note 269, § 4.5(5), at 655; Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive Damages 
Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1432–33 (2004) (“A second related theory 
notes that punitive damages may resemble restitution. In some cases, juries appear to 
determine the extent of the benefit that defendant reaped by its wrongful conduct and to assess 
that amount as punitive damages. While not compensatory, the recovery also is not exactly 
punitive.”). 
 272. Rendleman, supra note 266, at 999.  
 273. Id. Some states prohibit the recovery of both restitution and punitive damages. See 
DOBBS, supra note 269, § 4.5(5), at 655. But this may be due to historical reasons more than 
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restitution as a back door method for collecting punitive 
damages . . . . [C]laims for restitution might lead to essentially 
punitive awards.”274 
In TruGreen Companies, L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, Inc.,275 the 
Utah Supreme Court noted the similarity between restitution and 
punitive damages and refused to allow restitution gain-based relief in 
a breach of contract action.276 The court explained: “[A]s a policy 
matter, we do not wish to adopt a remedy for breach of contract that 
punishes the breaching party.”277 This is also why Utah law prohibits 
the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract, even if 
intentional.278 Viewing restitution as no different than punitive 
damages, the court rejected “any measure of damages that punishes a 
breaching party.”279 
The overlap between restitution and punitive damages and the 
ability to use restitution as an alternative to punitive damages is even 
more apparent given that courts alter the measurement of a 
defendant’s gains depending on the level of reprehensibility.280 The 
new Third Restatement of Restitution acknowledges the viability of 
such alterations, setting out different rules for the measurement of 
the gain depending on whether the defendant is an innocent 




shared purposes. See Rendleman, supra note 266, at 1003.  
 274. See Paul T. Wangerin, Restitution for Intangible Gains, 54 LA. L. REV. 339, 346 
(1993) (citing Laycock, supra note 266, at 1288–90)). 
 275. 199 P.3d 929 (Utah 2008). 
 276. Numerous courts have limited the restitutionary recovery to the amount of 
compensatory damages when restitution is sought for breach of contract (either by using the 
contract price as the fair market value of the benefit conferred, or by limiting the recovery to 
the contract damages). Contract law does not allow any sort of damages that provide a windfall 
to the non-breaching party. Courts have not similarly limited the recovery in tort. Maybe this 
is because tort law does allow a type of damage that provides a windfall—punitive damages. 
 277. TruGreen, 199 P.3d at 933. 
 278. Id.  
 279. Id. 
 280. This is contested among courts. See Rendleman, supra note 266, at 1005. 
 281. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 49 cmt. a (2011) 
(acknowledging that the choice between different measures of the gain from nonreturnable 
benefits “turn[s] chiefly on the innocence or blameworthiness of the defendant”); id. § 50 
(defining the gain measurement for innocent recipients); id. § 51 (defining the gain 
measurements for conscious wrongdoers and defining the gain measurements for unconscious 
wrongdoers).  
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Outside of the Restatement, “distinctions based on culpability have 
considerable support in the cases.”282 
A classic illustration of the relevance of culpability in measuring 
the gain is Olwell v. Nye & Nissen, Co., where the defendant took the 
plaintiff’s egg-washing machine for its own use.283 In measuring the 
gain, the court was unsatisfied with using either the fair market or 
rental value of the machine.284 Neither option punished the 
defendant for its deliberate choice to steal the machine or deterred 
him from stealing again; to the contrary, the measures would 
encourage stealing because it would be less expensive than 
purchasing.285 Instead, the court looked to the amount that the 
defendant saved: the cost of hiring workers to clean the eggs.286 In 
order to sufficiently punish and deter the defendant, the court 
measured the defendant’s gain as these savings and awarded an 
amount almost triple the fair market value of the machine.287  
Restitution also includes a second level of recovery, what the 
Third Restatement labels “supplemental enrichment.”288 
Supplemental enrichment is the amount of profit or other gains that 
the defendant earned by virtue of his unjust enrichment.289 Once 
 
 282. Laycock, supra note 266, at 1289 (“The more culpable defendant’s behavior, and 
the more direct the connection between the profits and the wrongdoing, the more likely that 
plaintiff can recover all defendant’s profits.”); see also DOBBS, supra note 268, § 4.5(1) at 425 
(“When in doubt about which of two restitutionary measures is appropriate, the serious nature 
of conscious wrongdoing will at times justify the court in imposing the more radical 
measure.”). 
 283. 173 P.2d 652, 652 (Wash. 1946). 
 284. Id. at 654. The reasonable rental value and fair market value of the machine are 
somewhat similar to the amount of the plaintiff’s injury—how much the plaintiff lost by the 
defendant’s choice to steal the machine instead of buying or renting it from the plaintiff, 
although neither are truly damages because the plaintiff was not seeking to sell the machine.   
 285. See DOBBS, supra note 269, § 4.5(5), at 655 (“[R]estitution helps remove incentives 
for tortious conduct by denying the defendant the hope of gain . . . .”). 
 286. Olwell, 173 P.2d at 653–55. 
 287. Id. The estimate of the fair market value of the machine is based on plaintiff’s offer 
to sell the machine to defendant for $600. Id. at 653. The lower court instead granted 
restitutionary relief totaling $1,560 based on the costs saved in not hiring workers to clean the 
eggs. Id. 
 288. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 53(1) (2011) (explaining that 
supplement enrichment can include “interest, rent, or other measure of use value”). 
 289. As an example, if the defendant converted the beneficiary’s funds and then earned 
$1 million by reinvesting, the beneficiary can recover both the amount that the defendant stole 
and the $1 million earned. Id. § 53(2)–(3) (making a conscious wrongdoer liable for non-
remote consequential gains, meaning those “profits realized through the defendant’s 
subsequent dealings with such an asset”).  
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again, the defendant’s culpability factors into the measure of the 
defendant’s supplemental enrichment, including what to deduct 
from those profits.290 Probably the most commonly claimed 
deduction is that a portion of the profits is attributable to the 
defendant’s own efforts.291 
The court must determine which part of the profit results from the 
defendant’s own independent efforts and which part results from 
the benefits provided by the plaintiff. . . . The allocation of the 
burden of establishing such approximation, and degree of 
specificity of proof required, may be affected by such factors as the 
seriousness of the defendant’s wrongdoing . . . . Where the relative 
contributions of the two parties are inseparable or untraceable, 
there should be no recovery of profits by the plaintiff unless the 
defendant is a very serious wrongdoer.292  
 
 
 290. Id. § 53 cmt. a (“[T]he decision to hold the recipient liable for supplemental 
enrichment frequently turns on distinctions of fault.”); id. § 51(5) (explaining that in 
calculating deductions and credits to the defendant’s profits, “the court may apply such tests of 
causation and remoteness, may make such apportionments, may recognize such credits or 
deductions, and may assign such evidentiary burdens, as reason and fairness dictate, consistent 
with the object of restitution”). As examples, some courts do not allow any deduction for 
overhead costs attributable to and income taxes associated with the profits if the defendant’s 
wrongdoing was willful. See, e.g., Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992); Frank 
Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 1985). Even the 
courts that allow the deduction particularly scrutinize the claimed overhead and profits; 
otherwise, the remedy “would offer little discouragement” to the wrongdoers. Hamil Am. Inc. 
v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing deduction of overhead costs despite willful 
infringement, but mandating that the lower court require the defendant to establish the link 
between the overhead expenses and the profits with “particular rigor”). Specific to income 
taxes, the federal rule is that willful infringers are not allowed to deduct the amount of taxes 
paid on the profits. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 99–100 
(1928). The federal courts are split regarding whether the same limitation applies to less 
culpable defendants. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487–88 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 291. DOBBS, supra note 268, § 4.5(3), at 435 (“Even the wilful wrongdoer should not 
be made to give up that which is his own; the principle is disgorgement, not plunder. . . . But 
sometimes courts have deviated from this[,] . . . a deviation that combines justice with 
punishment.”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION, 
HORNBOOK SERIES § 4.3, 242–43 (1st ed. 1973) (“Even a wrongdoer probably ought not be 
to deprived of values added to property by his own wit, experience or hard work, unless the 
court makes a conscious decision to impose punitive damages.”).  
 292. EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 120–21 
(Colo. 1995) (internal citations omitted). Notably, in EarthInfo, the court actually imposed 
the burden of apportionment on the plaintiff due to “the nature and extent of the breach as 
well as the other relevant factors.” Id. 
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Under this analysis, even if it looks as if a defendant’s efforts 
contributed to all of the profits, the plaintiff will still recover the 
defendant’s profits if the defendant was very culpable and 
blameworthy.293 Depending on the defendant’s culpability, courts 
have discretion to make the defendant—and do make the 
defendant—pay more than he profited.294  
C. Basing Punitive Damages on the Defendant’s Gain 
Despite restitution’s punitive quality,295 it has not been the 
subject of criticism like punitive damages, and defendants seldom 
complain about restitution awards. Specific to possible procedural 
issues, defendants generally do not complain that the amount of the 
award was unexpected or unpredictable. And how could it be? It is 
based on the conduct for which the defendant is liable.  
Punitive damages could similarly be based on the defendant’s 
gain. This gain-based measurement for punitive damages produces a 
personalized punitive damage award for each case, particularly 
tailored to the defendant’s tortious conduct. The possibility of 
flexible measurement of the gain, already recognized in restitution, 
also enables sufficient punishment and deterrence. And most 
importantly, this gain-based measurement enables predictability to 
the defendant because of the actual factual connection between the 
amount of damages and the tortious conduct.  
1. Creating a factual connection between the punitive award and the 
tortious conduct 
The two purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter.296 
These purposes themselves, however, provide little guidance on how 
to translate them into dollar figures. Under the current system, 
instructing the jury to consider the need to punish and deter—or 
even to consider the nature of the wrong—translates, unfortunately, 
into punitive awards that have no relationship to the tortious 
conduct. 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. DOBBS, supra note 268, at 277 (“In the profit cases taken as a whole, one or two 
things stand out. One is that some of the cases opt for a very harsh rule that takes from the 
defendant considerably more money that he has profited.”). 
 295. Rendleman, supra note 266, at 981–83. 
 296. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008).  
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The Court acknowledged this factual disconnect between 
punitive damages and the actual case in Snepp v. United States.297 The 
government sued Frank W. Snepp III, a former CIA agent who had 
published a book based on his experiences as a CIA agent.298 The 
publication of this book breached Snepp’s employment contract and 
constituted a breach of fiduciary obligation.299 In discussing the 
government’s possible remedies, the Court explained:  
No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a 
publication such as Snepp’s generally are unquantifiable. Nominal 
damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The 
punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and 
unusual. Even if recovered, they may bear no relation to either the 
Government’s irreparable loss or Snepp’s unjust gain.300 
Instead of punitive damages, the Court granted the 
government’s requested restitutionary remedy based on the profits 
that Snepp earned through publishing the book.301 The Court 
declared that the requested restitution-based remedy was the “most 
appropriate . . . for Snepp’s acknowledged wrong.”302 The Court 
specifically preferred a restitution, gain-based measure to right the 
wrong rather than punitive damages.303  
The reason for that preference is the factual connection between 
the amount of the defendant’s gain and the remedy. No such factual 
connection exists between the facts of the case and punitive damage 
awards currently. The Court also recognized this in Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, lamenting that jury instructions would not achieve 
predictable punitive damage awards unless punitive damages were 
tied to a fact in the case.304  
 
 297. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 298. Id. at 508. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 514. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Rendleman, supra note 266, at 1001. Notably, the restitution award did not include 
any discount based on Snepp’s contribution to writing the book. Id. at 1001 n.124. This is 
rather harsh given that Snepp’s only “wrong” was that he did not seek pre-publication 
clearance from the government; the book did not include any classified information. Snepp, 
444 U.S. at 509. The lack of classified information is why the appellate court denied the 
constructive trust, leaving the government to pursue nominal damages and the possibility of 
punitive damages. Id. 
 304. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008) (explaining that jury 
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To connect punitive damages to the facts in individual cases, 
punitive damages could, like restitution, be based on the defendant’s 
gain. Basing punitive damages on the defendant’s gain “has the 
ability to limit awards to a fixed, rational amount.”305 The amount is 
rational both because of this factual connection and because basing 
punitive damages on the amount of the defendant’s gain fulfills both 
the punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive  
damages. This is already evident from restitution, where courts are 
not shy to use restitution to achieve punitive and deterrent effects.306  
More specific to punishment within the context of punitive 
damages, the defendant’s gain may directly reflect the 
reprehensibility of the conduct; financial motivation renders conduct 
more reprehensible.307 But even when the defendant was not 
financially motivated, the gain represents the tortious conduct and 
provides a measurement tailored to that tortious conduct. And 
specific to deterrence, the Supreme Court described the 
restitutionary relief in Snepp as specifically tailored to achieve 
deterrence.308 Basing the punitive award on the gain helps remove 
the incentive to commit the conduct.309 Scholars have similarly 
 
instructions cannot achieve predictability and consistency as long as punitive damage “awards 
are not tied to specifically proven items of damage”).  
 305. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 306. See supra Part VI.B.2. 
 307. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 494.  
 308. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515 (“Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter 
those who would place sensitive information at risk.”). 
 309. See DOBBS, supra note 269, § 4.5(5), at 655 (“[R]estitution helps remove incentives 
for tortious conduct by denying the defendant the hope of gain . . . .”). In weighing the 
potential gain versus losing the potential gain through punitive damages, the defendant may 
also consider that the chance of one day paying those punitive damages is less than 100%—the 
plaintiff may not ever discover the defendant’s tort, choose not to sue, etc. See infra notes 
318–320 and accompanying text. The cost-internalization theory of punitive damages, 
proposed by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, factors this reduced chance of being 
caught in its measurement of punitive damages designed to achieve deterrence by 
“multiply[ing] a punitive award in order to make up for the number of times that a tortfeasor 
gets away with harming people without having to pay any damages.” Keith Hylton, Reflections 
on Remedies and Philip Morris, 27 REV. LITIG. 9, 14 (2007). The Court’s prohibition on 
punishing for harm to non-parties in Philip Morris limits this theory to the chance that the 
tortfeasor would get away with harming the specific plaintiff. See Markel, supra note 250, at 
1408 (“To my mind, the better reading of Philip Morris finds that cost internalization’s future 
is impeded but not destroyed.”). The cost-internalization theory, with this post-Philip Morris 
limitation, is another type of damage available in Professor Markel’s pluralistic system.  
  Practically, it may not be in the defendant’s best interests to guesstimate the chance 
of being sued. This depends on many factors, including whether the plaintiff is litigious and 
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recognized the relevance of the defendant’s gain to the deterrence 
purpose of punitive damages.310 Gain-elimination theories survive 
Philip Morris, which prohibits punishment for harm to non-parties, 
as long as the gain is limited to the gain made from the conduct to 
the specific plaintiff.311 Not surprisingly, measurements of the gain 
are similarly limited in restitution.  
As an example of a possible measurement of gain-based punitive 
damages, take the facts of Philip Morris. The plaintiff smoked for 
many years and brought suit against the defendant due to injuries 
that resulted from smoking. The defendant’s tortious conduct was 
basic fraud—selling cigarettes while failing to disclose the associated 
health risks.312 Using a gain-based measure of punitive damages, the 
defendant’s punitive award would be based on the gains it made in 
selling cigarettes to the plaintiff. A punitive award based on the gain 
earned in selling cigarettes to the plaintiff is specifically tailored to 
the facts of the case—unlike the $79.5 million the jury awarded in 
the case.313 An award based on the defendant’s gain is no longer 
unusual or speculative.  
 
 
the amount of compensatory damages—neither of which the defendant likely knows before 
committing the tort. See supra Parts V.A.1.–V.A.2. Because of the unpredictability of suit, this 
Article does not propose multiplying the gain-based punitive award based on the chance of 
suit. Neither did the Court in Snepp, where it found that the restitution award is “tailored to 
deter those who would place sensitive information at risk” without addressing the chances of 
being caught. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515.    
 310. Professor Keith Hylton advocates a gain-elimination theory of punitive damages, 
which dictates that the award cannot be “less than the profit earned by the offender from some 
offensive act” if the conduct at issue is not socially desirable. Hylton, supra note 309, at 14–
15. If the defendant’s gain is $500 and the plaintiff’s losses total $100, the punitive award 
should total $400. Id. at 14. The goal of gain elimination is complete deterrence, meaning to 
deter the defendant and others from committing similar conduct. Id. at 15, 19–20. If the 
conduct is generally socially desirable, Professor Hylton advocates the cost internalization 
theory proposed by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. Id. at 15.  
 311. Hylton, supra note 309, at 28 (acknowledging that the Court was not persuaded by 
his gain elimination theory in Philip Morris); cf. Markel, supra note 250, at 1410 (arguing that 
the cost internalization theory could survive Philip Morris if “the operative questions” are 
changed to “what harm did the defendant cause this case’s plaintiff(s), and what is the 
likelihood that the defendant would escape having to pay for that harm to this case’s 
plaintiff(s)”). 
 312. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2007). 
 313. Id. at 351. 
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2. But would it punish and deter enough? 
“[E]mpirical studies show that [people] ‘disagree profoundly’ 
over how severely to punish any given crime. . . . Once we move 
beyond an ‘eye for an eye,’ there is no easy way to convert crimes 
into terms of punishment.”314 The same could be said for how much 
deterrence is necessary, which can differ depending on the utility of 
the conduct.315 A punitive damage award could be five dollars. Even 
this amount punishes and deters the defendant, but few would think  
that a five-dollar punitive-damage award is sufficient—it does not 
punish enough and/or is not large enough to deter.  
The same problem will likely exist for punitive damages based on 
the defendant’s gain. Within his retributive damages scheme basing 
the award on a fraction of the defendant’s net worth, Professor 
Markel advocates additional gain-stripping if necessary. Gain-
stripping alone, however, would be inadequate according to Markel 
because it merely returns the defendant to the pre-tort status quo 
and thus “does not adequately communicate the wrongness of his 
action.”316 Simply returning to pre-tort status would likely fail to 
sufficiently deter some from committing tortious conduct a second 
time. 
Similarly, some have criticized the Supreme Court’s emphasis on 
predictability in Exxon based on the thought that making punitive 
damages predictable will inherently limit their deterrent effect.317 
 
 314. Fisher, supra note 153, at 38. 
 315. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 
GEO. L.J. 421, 443 (1998) (advocating different measurements for deterrence-based punitive 
damages based on the utility of the defendant’s conduct).  
 316. Markel, supra note 249, at 296 (“The gain-stripping penalty should be treated 
distinctly from the reprehensibility-based fine.”); see also Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534, 538 
(Cal. 1959) (“Courts award exemplary damages to discourage oppression, fraud, or malice by 
punishing the wrongdoer. . . . Such damages are appropriate in cases like the present one, 
where restitution would have little or no deterrent effect, for wrongdoers would run no risk of 
liability to their victims beyond that of returning what they wrongfully obtained.” (citations 
omitted)); Kelly, supra note 271, at 1433 (explaining that getting “restitution . . . large 
enough to be punitive . . . may involve aggregating the restitution claims of many persons”); 
Henry Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially 
Performing Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 35 (1982) (“[P]unitive damages offer a better corrective 
than does restitution. . . . Unlike restitution, punitive damages can be tailored to produce a 
given level of deterrence.”). 
 317. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 206, at 198 (“It is the unpredictability of punitive 
damages that in some instances, at least, gives them their greatest deterrent effect.”); Doug 
Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for Everyone?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
1, 19 (2009) (“[T]he possibility of a large but randomized sanction may also deter a potential 
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This assumption is debatable. In a different context, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that unpredictability actually weakened possible 
deterrent effects—finding that the haphazard application of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which imposes sanctions for frivolous 
litigation, diminished its intended deterrent effect.318 Punitive 
damages are imposed only if the plaintiff actually sues the defendant, 
gets to trial, establishes liability, establishes that the defendant acted 
with the requisite intent to make punitive damages available, 
convinces the jury to use its discretion to award punitive damages, 
and then the jury awards some amount. Even the Supreme Court 
thinks awards are unpredictable.319 This unpredictability may actually 
weaken any deterrent effect; “many parties will probably ignore the 
tiny possibility of a crushing financial loss, like the chance of being 
hit by lightning.”320  
Regardless, any emphasis on a punitive award sending a strong 
enough disapproval message or deterring enough cannot overwhelm 
the defendant’s constitutional right to fair notice of the likely severity 
of the award.321 Further, this emphasis is likely not as significant to 
the Supreme Court as most think. Every Supreme Court opinion on 
punitive damages since BMW has effectually made damages 
smaller,322 necessarily reducing the message of disapproval and 
 
miscreant.”). Basing punitive damages on the defendant’s gain is subject to the same criticism. 
See Klass, supra. 
 318. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 392–93 (1990). In other aspects 
of tort law, sometimes consequences are not imposed because they are deemed too 
unpredictable to create any real deterrent effect. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with 
Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 565–67 (1985); W. Jonathan Cardi, Randy Penfield & 
Albert H. Yoon, Does Tort Law Deter? 24 (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies, Working Paper 
No. 1851383, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1851383 (explaining results of 
recent survey of deterrent effects of possible civil liability and damages and criminal sanctions, 
which showed that “subjects proved just as likely to take risks when primed that they might be 
sued and might have to pay damages . . . as when they were told expressly that they could not 
possibly suffer criminal or civil consequences”).  
 319. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008).  
 320. Sugarman, supra note 318, at 567; see also Cardi et al., supra note 318 (“Existing 
social science literature tells us that the certainty of sanctions plays a strong role [in] their 
effectiveness as a deterrent . . . .”). 
 321. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting argument that punitive damage awards must remain unpredictable to 
sufficiently deter because although “the State has a strong interest in punishing wrongdoers . . 
. it has no legitimate interest in maintaining in pristine form a common-law system that 
imposes disproportionate punishment and that subjects defendants guilty of similar misconduct 
to wholly different punishments”). 
 322. BMW, State Farm, and Philip Morris all narrow the scope of what punitive damages 
DO NOT DELETE 2/2/2012 11:27 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
62 
possible deterrent effect. Philip Morris, especially, ensures smaller 
punitive damage awards by prohibiting punishment for harm to non-
parties. After Exxon, it is not even clear that the Court intends 
punitive damages to express disapproval. The Court discounted any 
relationship between punitive damages and moral condemnation, 
instead describing a punitive award as merely that amount the 
defendant should consider when determining whether to commit the 
tortious conduct.323 The number one concern in establishing 
measurements for punitive damages is predictability, and not in 
making them large enough to be “effective.”  
Any thought that a gain-based measure would be ineffective 
because it simply returns the defendant to her pre-tort status is 
overly simplistic. As illustrated in restitution, there is more than one 
way to measure gain. Olwell illustrated three different methods based 
on the defendant’s stealing of the egg-washing machine: the fair 
market value of the machine, the rental value of the machine, and 
the defendant’s saved costs. The facts of the case, mainly the 
defendant’s culpability, determined the proper measure—the saved 
cost. The gain-based restitution award made the defendant worse off 
than he was before stealing the machine.  
This same flexibility can exist in basing punitive damages on the 
defendant’s gain. It will be up to the parties to present alternative 
measurements to the jury. As an example, in BMW, the defendant 
misrepresented that a car was new when it had actually been 
repaired. Under this Article’s proposal, the plaintiff may suggest a 
punitive award in the amount that the defendant made in the sale of 
the car to the plaintiff, over $40,000.324 To counter, the defendant 
could suggest an amount based on the difference between the sale 
price of the car and the sale price had it been accurately represented 
as repaired, which was $4000.325 The jury can then evaluate those 
 
can punish, necessarily meaning punitive damage awards will be smaller. BMW prohibits 
punishment for out-of-state conduct, State Farm prohibits punishment for dissimilar conduct, 
and Philip Morris prohibits punishment for harm to nonparties. See generally BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 323. See Klass, supra note 206, at 198 (“[T]he defendant can simply build those punitive 
damages into the cost of pursuing the conduct in question.”). 
 324. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 564. This gain does not include deductions based on the cost 
to produce the car, but such a deduction is not necessarily required; the jury could choose to 
take that deduction if it wanted. Id. 
 325. Id.   
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alternative measurements based on the circumstances of the case, 
including the defendant’s culpability. The gain-based punitive award 
is also awarded on top of the compensatory award, further 
emphasizing the severity of the total consequences of the tortious 
conduct.326 Whichever measure the jury chooses, however, it will not 
be arbitrary—it will relate directly to the defendant’s conduct.327 
3. Potential measurement issues  
Restitution is available in tort in any case in which the facts allow 
it, meaning in cases in which the defendant has a gain. That is not all 
torts.328 So how would punitive damages work under this proposal in 
cases in which there is no such gain? 
Exxon is one of these cases. Justice Souter classified the 
defendant’s conduct in allowing a known relapsed alcoholic to 
captain the tanker as “profitless to the tortfeasor.”329 At the time of 
the crash, the tanker was carrying fifty-three million gallons of crude 
oil to the lower forty-eight states.330 Certainly, losing eleven to 
thirty-two million gallons of crude oil did not cause the defendant to 
make a profit.  
But it is still possible to find a gain based on this tortious 
conduct, a lesson learned from the variety of methods available to 
measure gain for purposes of assessing restitution damages. The gain 
could be based on the amount the defendant saved in not hiring a 
new captain, or in building a single hull tanker.331 To suggest a larger 
amount, the plaintiff may point to the amount the defendant would 
have made in selling the oil in the tanker that crashed. This gain is 
what motivated the defendant to put the tanker in the water in the 
 
 326. See Heriot, supra note 251, at 881 (arguing that “[i]n the ordinary tort case,” 
requiring a defendant to pay compensatory damages alone “will ordinarily be enough to deter 
him from his wrongful conduct in the future”). 
 327. See id. at 883 (“Unlike punitive damages, however, restitution is not open-ended.”). 
 328. The most typical tort claims that involve fact patterns ripe for restitution involve the 
defendant taking the plaintiff’s property, whether by fraud, embezzlement, or conversion. 
DOBBS, supra note 269, §4.1(1) at 553. 
 329. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 511 (2008). 
 330. Id. at 476–77.  
 331. “By building single hull tankers,” instead of double hull tankers, “the company 
saved about two million dollars per ship” even though single hull tankers also meant that “in 
the event of a major collision . . .  oil would be discharged directly into the sea.” Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution—the Kepone Incident and a Review of First 
Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 673 (1995). 
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first place—and to not bother to make sure its captain was fit. Thus, 
even in situations that the defendant was not specifically financially 
motivated to commit the tortious conduct, just as the Exxon 
defendant did not expect to profit from retaining a relapsed alcoholic 
captain, the context of the defendant’s conduct provides possible 
bases for measuring the gain.  
Studies show that “the beneficiaries of punitive damages are 
often business plaintiffs suing business defendants.”332 Even when 
specific financial motivation is not present, these business contexts 
can provide bases for measuring the gain. In an employment 
discrimination case, did the employer make any gains traceable to the 
harassed employee? Or, did the employer save any expenses in not 
having to hire a replacement employee? Either option could serve as 
the gain. In a defamation case,333 the gain could be the profits made 
selling the material containing the defamatory statement. 
Some torts, however, do not involve either financial motivation 
or a business/commercial context, like the traditional intentional 
torts of battery and assault. How then does one value the 
defendant’s gain?334 First, it is important to understand these 
“intentional tort” cases make up an insubstantial portion of the cases 
in which punitive damages are awarded. According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, in 
2005, “intentional tort” cases made up only sixteen percent of all 
cases in which punitive damages were awarded by juries.335 And this 
sixteen percent includes more than just battery or assault—
intentional tort is defined as “personal injury or property damages 





 332. Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of 
Jury Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 855, 866 (2010).  
 333. Id. at 863 tbl.1 (analyzing U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Civil Justice Survey of 
State Courts data based on 2005 jury-produced punitive awards and concluding that punitive 
damages were awarded in almost half of the “slander, libel, defamation” cases in which the 
damages were sought). 
 334. See Laycock, supra note 266, at 1287 (“Many wrongful acts are destructive; they 
harm plaintiff without benefiting defendant.”). 
 335. Vidmar & Holman, supra note 332, at 864 tbl.2. 
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property.”336 So a portion of even these cases may be especially ripe 
for a gain-based measure if they involve the taking of property.  
Still, some of these intentional torts will be motivated by pure 
emotion and committed within a context not providing any basis for 
measuring the gain. What if the defendant shoots the plaintiff simply 
because she wants to? How do we measure the gain based on this 
type of sick motivation and pleasure attained through the 
shooting?337  
One possibility is to try to quantify the defendant’s pleasure. 
Putting a number on this intangible gain is really no different than 
the jury putting a number on the plaintiff’s intangible losses, like 
pain and suffering.338 For instance, let the jury evaluate how much 
pleasure the defendant derived from the shooting or how much the 
shooting was worth to her. Translated a bit more concretely, how 
much would the defendant have paid to make the tort happen? 
Relevant evidence would include the defendant’s motivation and her 
overall financial situation; less wealthy defendants would lack the 
means to pay as much as wealthier defendants. Using the evidence, 
the jury would put a number on the defendant’s intangible gain 
earned from committing the tort and that number would be the 
amount of punitive damages.  
 
 336. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH 
AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 11 (2008), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=554 (defining intentional torts). The 
same publication based on 2001 case data shows that conversion, an intentional tort involving 
property damage, was included within the “intentional tort” definition in the 2005 
publication. See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE AWARDS IN STATE COURTS, 2001 (2004), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=559 (separately listing statistics for 
intentional tort and conversion cases).  
  The defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s property may easily provide a measurable gain. 
Notably, the “intentional tort” category did not include “fraud,” which the BJS categorized as 
a “contract case” despite the category being made up of torts, including “claim[s] of negligent 
or intentional misrepresentation of a person, product, or service within a legal contract.” 
LANGTON & COHEN, supra note 336. Using the BJS data, twenty-eight percent of the “fraud” 
cases included a request for punitive damages, and the juries awarded damages in thirty-seven 
percent of these cases. Vidmar & Holman, supra note 332, at 862–64 tbls. 1, 2.     
 337. See Wangerin, supra note 274, at 358 (“How can the sick pleasure reaped from 
sexual or racial harassment be quantified?”). 
 338. Courts have not warmed to the idea of restitution based on intangible gains because 
of the measurement problem. “[T]he quantification problem that seemingly inhibits courts 
from awarding remedies for intangible gains does not trouble them whatsoever when it comes 
to awarding remedies for intangible losses.” Id. at 356. 
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4. Finally—a predictable punitive damage  
Any potential reform of punitive damages must achieve 
predictable awards. A gain-based punitive damage measure provides 
this predictability because of the factual connection it creates to the 
case—and more specifically, a factual connection based on the 
defendant’s own conduct. The predictability of such an award is 
apparent based on the current use of the same measure in restitution.  
The defendant’s gain is knowable to the defendant. Assuming a 
rational actor, at the same time the potential tortfeasor is evaluating 
the potential consequences of the tort, the defendant is also 
evaluating the expected gains. Why commit the tort? What does the 
defendant expect to get or accomplish through committing the tort? 
The punitive damage award is then based precisely on that gain. 
In Snepp, for example, the defendant published a book based on his 
CIA experiences without obtaining the required pre-publication 
clearance. Presumably, the defendant was at least partially motivated 
to publish the book by his desire to earn  income. Even if this was 
not the specific motivation, the defendant knew he would make 
profits from publishing the book. The defendant thus lacked any 
valid complaint that the amount of the restitution award was 
unpredictable; to the contrary, it was tailored specifically to the 
tortious conduct.  
True, the defendant may not know the exact amount of gains 
pre-tort. But that type of precision is not required. Neither due 
process nor Exxon predictability requires notice of the exact amount. 
Procedural due process requires only “fair” notice of the likely 
severity. Similarly, Exxon predictability envisions providing the 
defendant only with “some ability” to look ahead. And Justice 
Souter’s focus on the federal criminal sentencing guidelines,339 which 
provide ranges as opposed to set sentences,340 demonstrates that his 
conception of predictability does not require knowledge of specific 
dollar amounts. 
But the defendant in Snepp did know he was committing a 
wrong,341 and the restitution award he faced was based precisely on 
that wrong. Under the current procedures in place, any punitive 
damages awarded in Snepp likely would have no relationship to the 
 
 339. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008). 
 340. Id. at 504–06.  
 341. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980). 
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tortious conduct,342 leaving ample room for a defendant to be 
blindsided by the amount. But the defendant in Snepp was not 
blindsided because the award was based on his tortious conduct. 
Predictability is possible despite the necessary variability in 
measuring the gain. In Snepp, no adjustment was made based on the 
defendant’s contributions to the book.343 Although the defendant 
may not think this is substantively fair, there is still little room for 
procedural complaint. Again, he knew that his conduct was 
improper, and the punitive award was tailored specifically to that 
tortious conduct.  
Borrowing from a famous restitution case, the egg-washing 
machine thief in Olwell stole the machine because it did not want to 
buy its own. The defendant knew that it was saving itself the expense 
of buying or renting a machine, or from hiring employees to do the 
washing without a machine. The court reviewed possible restitution 
awards based on a fair market value of the machine, the fair rental 
value of the machine, or the costs saved in not having to hire 
employees. All these possibilities related back to exactly why the 
defendant committed the tort and the tort itself. Even though these 
awards were different amounts, each of these awards was predictable 
to the defendant because they were all based on the theft of the egg-
washing machine.  
Restitution awards are predictable to the defendant because they 
are based on their tortious conduct; punitive damages based on the 
defendant’s gain would similarly be predictable. Using the facts of 
BMW, before the tort, the defendant planned to sell the car without 
disclosing the repairs. At trial, the plaintiff likely would have argued 
for a gain-based punitive damage award totaling the $40,000 the 
defendant made in the sale of the car, whereas the defendant likely 
would have advocated a more limited $4000 award. Despite this 
variation, predictability exists because both numbers are traceable 
back to the defendant’s tortious conduct—deceit in selling the car.  
Using tortious conduct as the basis for the punitive award even 
provides predictability in cases where the defendant experiences only 
an intangible gain from committing the tort. The punitive award 
would be based on this intangible gain, not unlike the jury’s 
determination of a plaintiff’s pain and suffering.  
 
 342. Id. at 514. 
 343. Rendleman, supra note 266, at 1001 n.124.  
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Acknowledging that pain and suffering compensatory damages 
are unpredictable, the intent of this Article is not to suggest 
switching to yet another system that will also produce unpredictable 
awards. The reasons that pain and suffering compensatory damages 
are unpredictable do not also apply to measurements of intangible 
gain.  
First, part of why pain and suffering damages are unpredictable is 
because they are based on the plaintiff and her injury.344 The 
defendant likely has no pre-existing knowledge of the plaintiff’s pre-
existing medical conditions or pain tolerance; the damages are based 
directly on these unknowable facts.345  
The defendant’s gain, on the other hand, is knowable to the 
defendant before he commits the tort. The defendant may not know 
exactly how the jury will measure the gain, just as the defendant in 
Olwell may not have known that restitution would be based on saved 
costs instead of the fair market value of the machine. But the 
defendant does know the tortious conduct. And the punitive damage 
award the defendant may later face will be based on that tortious 
conduct.  
The second reason that pain and suffering compensatory 
damages are unpredictable is because they lack an economic 
reference point. The plaintiff can testify regarding his pain and 
suffering, but he is not competent to value it economically. There is 
no market to value the price of people enduring massive injuries and 
the accompanying pain and suffering. And aside from the 
measurement problem, truly no amount of money can fix a plaintiff’s 
pain and suffering and make him whole.346  
Again, this reason does not apply to valuing the defendant’s 
intangible gain as it is easier to put a number on the amount of the 
defendant’s intangible gain. The defendant sought something from 
 
 344. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 224, at 923 (acknowledging that some of the variation in 
pain and suffering awards given to plaintiffs suffering similar physical injuries “may legitimately 
reflect claimants’ precise individual circumstances, as the tort system intends”). 
 345. This factual connection to the plaintiff’s actual injury also helps legitimize the 
damages. The amount of punitive damages currently lacks any factual connection to actual 
injury, hurting the legitimacy of such damages. A gain-based punitive damage measure would 
create a factual connection, helping increase the legitimacy of these damages.  
 346. See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for 
Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 375 (2006) (suggesting that the recovery for 
intangible losses was not historically linked to making the plaintiff whole and that this link 
should not hamper reform efforts). 
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committing the tort and would have paid some amount to make the 
tort happen.347 Although not legal, there is a market for buying 
services to commit torts. The defendant’s testimony and other 
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s tortious 
conduct can be used to evaluate how much that particular defendant 
would have paid a third party to commit the tort he/she committed, 
thereby providing a reliable basis for assessing the punitive damage 
award amount. 
A gain-based measure for punitive damages, even if the gain is 
intangible only, “is not open-ended.”348 It is instead constrained by 
the defendant’s tortious conduct and the gain achieved through that  
conduct. This factual constraint makes the damages predictable to 
the defendant, as Exxon and procedural due process require.  
Basing punitive damages on the defendant’s gain will not only 
provide predictability, but will also create a consistent measurement 
for all defendants. Defendants currently face this same measurement 
in restitution and there is little, if any, complaint of inconsistent 
results among awards. 
True, two similarly situated defendants committing the same 
tortious conduct may end up paying different amounts of punitive 
damages under this Article’s proposal. But, awards will be identical if 
the gains are identical, like in the two BMW decisions the Court 
mentions anecdotally in Exxon.349 Further, consistency does not 
mandate identical awards: even Exxon admits so. The next tortfeasor 
should not automatically face the same punishment as the original 
because circumstances will likely differ. Each punitive damage award 
should reflect the specific circumstances. This is likely at least one of 
the reasons that the Court’s predictability analysis in Exxon did not 
simply force consistency based on prior awards.350  
Importantly, though, any variations in punitive damage awards 
will properly reflect the different facts of cases, and more specifically, 
the different gains. Each case involves different facts and different 
 
 347. Essentially, by committing the tort himself, the defendant has saved costs, just like 
the defendant in Olwell. 
 348. Heriot, supra note 251, at 883 (arguing that restitution is preferable to punitive 
damages because restitution “fits into the civil system with far more grace than punitive 
damages”). 
 349. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500–01 (2008).  
 350. See Part IV.D (exploring the Court’s analysis of predictability using the particular 
facts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill). 
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torts;351 defendants’ expected gains differ, so differing awards are still 
legitimate. The inconsistency is appropriate just as restitution awards 
must be inconsistent to ensure that no defendant retains a gain that 
he should not have retained, or just as compensatory damage awards 
must be inconsistent to achieve full compensation. The 
measurement—the defendant’s gain—will remain constant. Any 
variation should reflect different tortious conducts, and this 
measurement will achieve these proper variations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In 1991, Justice O’Connor spotted a procedural due process 
violation in the use of common law jury instructions for imposing 
punitive damages.352 When speculating why the rest of the Court did 
not agree with her, she explained that maybe “the Court is 
reluctant . . . because it perceives that such a ruling would force [it] 
to evaluate the constitutionality of every State’s punitive damages 
scheme.”353 In that sense, substantive due process challenges to 
punitive damages are easier; a finding that an award is 
unconstitutional affects only that award. But substantive review of 
due process awards is piecemeal and an inefficient way to achieve 
reform. 
Fast forward to 2008 and it seems that a majority of the Court 
now agrees with Justice O’Connor. The reluctance is still there, 
which explains why the Court purported to base Exxon in maritime 
law (without really discussing it). Regardless of the word games, the 
Supreme Court concluded in Exxon that common law jury 
instructions are incapable of producing predictable punitive awards.  
Predictability is no different than fair notice of severity. The roots 
of both concepts are traceable to the rule of law and both necessarily 
require notice of the likely amount for which the plaintiff will be 
liable. The dramatic similarities between the Exxon opinion and 
Justice O’Connor’s procedural due process-based Haslip dissent also 
show the procedural relevance of predictability. It is a mistake to 
overlook Exxon. Common law jury instructions are incapable of 
producing predictable awards; they are similarly incapable of 
producing awards that are at a level of severity of which the 
 
 351. Exxon, 554 U.S at 506. 
 352. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 353. Id. at 64. 
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defendant had notice—as procedural due process has required since 
BMW. Like any procedural due process-based reversal of punitive 
damages, the Court’s Exxon holding has far-reaching consequences. 
Not only is the specific award in Exxon invalid, but all awards 
imposed using the same jury instructions are invalid.  
Reform is necessary to produce predictable punitive awards. The 
Supreme Court’s suggestion in Exxon will not do so because of its 
use of compensatory damages as a baseline. Compensatory damages 
are dependent on the plaintiff, her circumstances, and her injury. 
Even if the defendant had extensively researched his plaintiff, 
compensatory damages for intentional torts specifically mandate 
compensation of unforeseeable consequences. Even if the damages 
were predictable, the compensatory damage baseline is still illogical 
given the lack of connection between the damages and tortious 
conduct.  
Fortunately, tort law already recognizes a punitive remedy that 
could and should be the basis for reform. Restitution, a civil remedy 
based on the defendant’s gain, is overlooked, just like Exxon. The 
way that courts alter the gain measurement in light of culpability 
shows that restitution serves the same purposes as punitive 
damages—punishment and deterrence. Punitive damages should 
similarly be based on the defendant’s gain. The flexibility in 
measuring gains means the damages have the ability to achieve 
sufficient punishment and deterrence. And, importantly, the amount 
of punitive damages would finally have a factual connection to the 
case, making them predictable to the defendant—as Exxon and 
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